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ACCEPTING THE LIMITS OF TAX LAW
AND ECONOMICS
Alex Raskolnikovt
This Article explores the limits of tax law and economics, attributing
them to the unique complexity of the tax optimization problem. Designers of
the optimal tax system must account for the impossibility of deterring socially
undesirable behavior, provide for redistribution, and minimize social costs
on the basis of assumptions that are laden with deeply contested value judg-
ments, pervasive empirical uncertainty, or both. Given these challenges, it is
hardly surprising that economic theory has a much weaker connection to the
content of our tax laws and their enforcement than it does to the content and
enforcement of many other legal regimes. This weakness has a profound ef-
fect on the debates about the fundamental features of our tax system. It
shapes the meaning of the foundational tax concepts. It affects many famil-
iar arguments about anti-avoidance rules and sanctions. And it extends to
evaluating outright tax evasion. In sum, the limits of tax law and econom-
ics shape every aspect of tax law and tax administration. At the same time,
accepting these limits shifts focus to several research agendas where tax law
and economics will continue to make valuable contributions to the project of
improving our tax system.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress holds endless hearings about efficiency of the tax sys-
tem.' Lawyers continuously argue about efficiency of tax rules and
sanctions. And just about every tax professor in the country in-
troduces her students to the world of tax by articulating the goals of
equity, administrability, and-you guessed it-efficiency.2 Efficiency
is important. Efficiency is desirable. Efficiency is good.
Yet, efficiency maximization-the ultimate goal of law and eco-
nomics-has had little impact on the content of the Internal Revenue
Code. A more robust and expansive welfare maximization approach
has had only a marginal influence as well. There is a substantial diver-
gence between general law and economics and tax law and economics
in terms of both their analytical tool kits and their impact on the de-
sign of real-life regulatory regimes. The reasons for this divergence
and its implications for tax policy are the focus of this Article.
The reach of tax law and economics is more limited than the
reach of general law and economics, and this is no accident. The task
of designing the optimal tax system is immensely more difficult than
I See, e.g., Does the Tax System Support Economic Efficiency, Job Creation, and Broad-Based
Economic Growth?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Finance) (discussing the need for tax
reform); Tax Reform: Historical Trends in Income and Revenue: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 111th Cong. 13 (2010) (statement of Dr. Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff Joint
Comm. on Taxation) (discussing the efficiency consequences of eliminating the tax code's
double taxation of corporate income).
2 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440,
498 (2009) (referring to "the traditional tax policy goals of equity, efficiency, and
administrability").
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the task of designing the optimal competition policy, corporate law,
securities regulation, and so on. The additional complexity arises due
to three related problems (or challenges). One of the three is well
understood; the other two are much less appreciated. While one or
two of these problems could be successfully addressed in isolation, the
combination of the three makes the economic analysis of tax rules
and sanctions uniquely complex.
The first problem arises because taxation is fundamentally differ-
ent from pollution, speeding, and other externality-producing activi-
ties that are the primary focus of law and economics. Individuals'
responses to taxation are inefficient not only because they give rise to
negative externalities. Rather, these responses are wasteful because
they are nonconsensual money transfers from the government to tax-
payers that are conceptually similar to theft, insider trading, price fix-
ing, and the like. All these transfers are inefficient even if they
produce no negative externalities. And almost all these transfers may
be fully deterred at some cost. Not surprisingly, the optimal legal re-
gime for nonconsensual money transfers reflects the tradeoff between
the greater benefits of stronger deterrence and its greater costs.
While this analytical approach has been suggested only for a few anti-
trust violations, it applies in many other settings where nonconsensual
money transfers take place.3
But not in tax. Inefficient responses to taxation cannot be fully
deterred at any cost. Even if anti-avoidance rules eliminate all tax
shelters, taxpayers can always respond to taxes by working less, saving
less, selling or buying less than they would have done otherwise. No
legal rule can deter any of these responses. Yet their social costs may
be just as great as the costs of the most outrageous tax reduction
schemes. Therefore, while stronger anti-avoidance rules certainly in-
crease the cost of running a tax system, their social benefits are uncer-
tain. If so, an optimization strategy that trades off the costs and
benefits of greater deterrence cannot be deployed in the tax setting.
This undeterrability problem can be solved by making responses to
taxation impossible. A lump-sum tax imposes a burden that is un-
changed no matter what a taxpayer does. This perfectly efficient tax
has been known to economists for decades, yet it has found no practi-
cal application. A nonuniform lump-sum tax based on immutable tax-
payer characteristics such as earning ability is impossible to
implement because these characteristics are unobservable. A uniform
lump-sum tax is easily administrable but entirely unsatisfactory be-
cause it has extremely unappealing distributive consequences.
3 See Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Common Threat to Markets,
Firms, and the Fisc 10-11 (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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This brings us to the second (and well-known) challenge of tax
law and economics. While the general law and economics analysis typ-
ically focuses on efficiency alone, any plausible theory of an optimal
tax and transfer system must address redistribution. This redistribution
problem is particularly difficult in light of the undeterrability problem.
Quite simply, it is impossible to fully resolve both.
But it is possible to reach a compromise. The optimal tax theory
balances the benefits of redistribution against the inevitable costs of
tax-induced distortions to produce a welfare-maximizing regime.
That theory is the crown jewel of public economics. It is also pro-
foundly different from the economic analysis of externalities and
other market failures that provides a foundation for general law and
economics. That general analysis produces extremely powerful and
intuitive insights based on just a few assumptions that are easy to un-
derstand and fairly easy to accept, at least as working hypotheses-the
assumptions of rational behavior and social welfare maximization. In
contrast, the optimal tax theory does not get off the ground until, in
addition to making the same two assumptions, one agrees that ability
(or some other attribute) is the appropriate basis of redistribution,
chooses a proxy for the abstract and unquantifiable concept of ability,
develops a view about the optimal extent of redistribution, agrees on
the parameters that determine its cost, and settles on the manner in
which that cost will be traded off against the redistributive benefit, not
to mention deciding whether the optimization problem should focus
on national or global welfare. Each of these decisions is laden with
deeply contested value judgments, profound empirical uncertainty, or
both. Efforts to reduce tension by incorporating alternative views
make the theory completely intractable.
The result of this immense complexity, uncertainty, and value de-
pendence is unsurprising: Our tax system has little in common with
the optimal tax regime, at least in its canonical form. That regime-
the nonlinear labor income tax-has no tax on capital income, no
realization requirement, no corporate tax, no wealth-transfer tax of
any kind, no national borders, and none of the hodgepodge of ex-
emptions, deductions, and credits found in the Internal Revenue
Code.
This gap between the real and the ideal is at the heart of the third
problem of tax law and economics-the baseline problem. Most of the
general law and economics arguments depend critically on the close
connection between the ideal baseline of a perfectly efficient system
and the actual set of legal rules and sanctions under consideration.
This close connection is missing in the tax setting. Therefore, the
omnipresent second-best problem is much more severe in tax than it
is in other areas of economic regulation. It may be plausible for secur-
526 [Vol. 98:523
THE LIMITS OF TAX LAW AND ECONOMICS
ities scholars to assume that capital markets are generally efficient.4 It
may be reasonable for competition law scholars to posit that the econ-
omy is generally competitive.5 And it may be sensible for environmen-
tal law scholars to conclude that Adam Smith's "invisible hand" guides
the market in pollution permits to their efficient allocation.6 But it is
completely implausible for tax scholars to assert that our tax rules and
sanctions are anywhere close to optimal. Therefore, arguments about
changing these rules in order to approximate the welfare-maximizing
system are particularly weak in tax.
Accepting the limits of tax law and economics has profound im-
plications. Without an optimal system serving as a guidepost, it is im-
possible to answer the basic tax policy questions with the same
strength of conviction that is customary (and relatively more defensi-
ble) in law and economics generally. Should the tax on capital gains
be lower or higher than it is today (and should it be progressive, flat,
regressive, or even negative)? Should the corporate tax rate be re-
duced? Should dividends be subject to ordinary income tax rates, re-
duced rates, or not taxed at all? Should the United States adopt a
territorial tax regime? What about the estate tax that has remained on
life support for the past decade? These questions are not about some
obscure and inconsequential sections of the Internal Revenue Code;
they go to the core of our tax system. Yet none can be answered based
on the same type of reasoning that law and economics scholars rou-
tinely deploy when addressing other areas of economic regulation-
reasoning based on the goal of achieving a socially optimal legal
regime.
Accepting the limits of tax law and economics has many other
implications for the fundamental tax policy concepts and debates.
The single most important concept of the economic analysis of law-
efficiency-has very different meanings when deployed in and out of
tax. When nontax scholars critique a rule as "inefficient," they usually
4 See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 907 (1989) (referring to "the academic support for the
efficient markets hypothesis"); see also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations
Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945, 968 (1991) (explaining that "the legal presumption
of semi-strong form efficiency for stocks traded on the national exchanges may still be
warranted" despite critiques of the hypothesis's empirical underpinnings). Scholars have
offered several interpretations of what "efficient" means in this context, but this variety of
interpretation does not detract from the plausibility of the basic assumption. See, e.g., Ay-
res, supra, at 968-69 (distinguishing between informational efficiency and fundamental
efficiency); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation,
55 DuKE L.J. 711, 766-71 (2006) (distinguishing between efficient markets characterized
by accurate pricing and effective markets characterized by a corrective price mechanism).
5 See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITs PRACTICE 19-20 (3d ed. 2005).
6 Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New
Era from an Old Idea , 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 & n.26, 8-10 (1991).
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mean that the rule is inconsistent with the optimal system. An alterna-
tive rule that is not similarly deficient is clearly superior. In contrast,
referring to a tax rule as "inefficient" can only mean that it is distor-
tive. But any alternative rule that produces equal revenue would be
distortive as well, though perhaps less so. A choice between two dis-
tortive rules does not promise nearly as great a payoff as a choice be-
tween a nonoptimal and optimal provisions.
The ongoing debate about the relevance of horizontal equity is
another controversy affected by this Article's inquiry. Horizontal eq-
uity is wholly superfluous in a welfarist analysis of the optimal tax sys-
tem, yet it has remained important in evaluating the existing one.
Appreciation of the wide gap between the existing and the optimal,
combined with the pressing need to evaluate actual policies and re-
forms, explains the strong appeal of horizontal equity in real-life tax
policy debates. The same appreciation sheds light on the practical
relevance of a fundamental theoretical claim that the rate structure
should be the only redistributive tax instrument. This claim is an inte-
gral part of the optimal tax theory. But this theory's divergence from
reality suggests that we should be cautious in implementing one par-
ticular theoretical prescription. The same divergence presents a sig-
nificant challenge to the economic analysis of tax evasion.
The gap between tax theory and reality has other, less dramatic
implications as well. It means that many familiar legal arguments that
generally have strong efficiency foundations have no such foundations
in the tax setting. Should policymakers be careful not to overreach in
designing tax anti-avoidance rules? Should slight violations of tax laws
be subject to light punishment? Does it matter that a tax offender
eventually found liable may have been right or that addressing his vio-
lation helped to clarify the tax law? Should tax penalties be based on
the amount of tax underpayment? None of these questions may be
answered based on efficiency considerations in the simple, intuitive,
and convincing manner that is available outside of tax.
These conclusions suggest that the reach of tax law and econom-
ics is limited indeed. But they by no means undermine the value of
economic analysis of taxation. Revenue estimates of various reforms
as well as empirical studies of all sorts of elasticities and behavioral
effects supply policymakers with crucial and highly useful informa-
tion. Moreover, public finance scholars are developing models that
have a closer connection to the real world and are more useful in its
eValuation than the canonical optimal tax formulas. These studies,
estimates, and models, however, are the province of economists, not
lawyers. While important, they cannot form the core research agenda
of tax law and economics. What can?
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The answer lies in recognizing the unique advantages of econom-
ically oriented tax scholars. The first such advantage becomes appar-
ent as soon as the focus shifts from the lofty goal of devising the
optimal tax system to a more modest objective of evaluating incremen-
tal reforms. This is where economic theory has a reasonably close
connection to reality. Economists have developed tools for assessing
incremental changes, and these tools are particularly useful when ana-
lysts set aside contestable questions of distributive justice and focus on
efficiency alone. In order to apply these tools, however, the analyst
must understand the existing and possible future distortions created
by any given rule and its potential revision. Tax lawyers know and
understand tax rules-both in theory and in practice-much better
than public finance economists ever could. This understanding, com-
bined with the grasp of the economic costs of distortions, is a unique
comparative advantage of tax law and economics scholars. The same
is true of their deep appreciation of uncertainty created by most tax
rules and its effects on these rules' real-life operation. Finally, tax law
and economics scholars are institutionally well positioned to evaluate
tradeoffs between efficiency and other considerations. These are the
areas of inquiry where tax law and economics has the most to offer.
Not surprisingly, these are the areas where tax law and economics
scholars have made-and will continue to make-many valuable
contributions.
Part I of this Article identifies the three unique problems facing
tax law and economics and explains the resulting limitations of the
economic analysis of tax rules and sanctions. Part II investigates the
wide-ranging implications of these limitations. Part III asks whether
tax law and economics has a continuing vitality in light of its limita-
tions, answering this question with a definite (if qualified) "yes."
I
EXPLAINING THE LIMITS OF TAX LAW AND ECONOMICS
A casual observer is likely to conclude that the economic analysis
of taxation is similar to the economic analysis of many other areas of
the law dealing with commerce and finance. The subject of analysis is
always some form of economic activity. Scholars pay much attention
to efficiency, transaction costs, and externalities.7 They draw direct
7 See Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability, 63
TAx L. REv. 797, 797-98 (2010).
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analogies between tax and other areas of economic regulation.8 And
they analyze tax law violations jointly with other legal breaches.9
A closer look reveals, however, that tax law and economics is very
different from nontax (or general) law and economics. The same
terms have different meanings.10 Analogies are either misguided or
do not extend to the content of the law." Andjoint deterrence analy-
sis of tax and nontax violations is possible only if the analyst sets aside
the critical tax policy question.12 None of this is accidental. The fun-
damental nature of socially undesirable behavior is different in tax.
The manner in which legal rules may affect that behavior is different
as well. Most importantly, the social goal that justifies the tax regime
is different from the goals underlying competition law, environmental
law, corporate law, and securities regulation, to take some examples.
These differences give rise to three unique problems faced by scholars
engaged in the economic analysis of tax law. These problems are the
focus of this Part's analysis.
A. The Undeterrability Problem
The economic analysis of tax rules and sanctions (discussed in
detail below) is highly technical, hardly intuitive, and altogether dif-
ferent from the general law and economics approach. This diver-
gence is puzzling. Do tax law and economics scholars really need to
reinvent the wheel? Why not follow the lead of their economically
oriented counterparts studying other areas of the law dealing with ec-
onomic regulation? The answer, it turns out, can be reached only in
several steps. The first step is to consider whether the basic analytical
framework of law and economics applies to tax. We now turn to that
framework.
8 See, e.g., id. at 798-801 (analogizing between the optimal tort liability and the opti-
mal tax remittance regimes); Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the
Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 267 (2007) (analogizing between tax rules and tort
rules).
9 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that
Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INr'L REv. L. & ECON. 3, 3-5 (1992) (proposing a model for
analyzing inefficient acts, such as common crimes, parking violations, and tax evasion).
10 See infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (discussing the term "efficiency").
11 See, e.g., Logue & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 855 (limiting the analogy to tax adminis-
tration rather than the content of the substantive tax rules); Logue, supra note 8, at 267
(offering arguments based on the assumption of welfare-maximizing rules, an assumption
that may be plausible in the tort setting but is implausible in tax).
12 See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 9-10 (modeling the total harm caused by, for instance,
parking violations and tax evasion without focusing on the fundamental difference be-
tween the nature of external harm produced by these two offenses). For a discussion, see
Alex Raskolnikov, Are Graduated Tax Penalties Efficient? 9 (Sept. 15, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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1. The Basics of Law and Economics
The basic law and economics framework is built on two funda-
mental premises. First, individuals are assumed to be rational actors
maximizing their utility (or wellbeing).' 3 Second, it is assumed that
the objective of the legal system is (under the positive strand) or
should be (under the normative strand) to maximize social welfare
viewed as an aggregation of the welfare (utility) of each member of
society. 14 Both assumptions are controversial; 15 neither is questioned
in this Article.
If both assumptions are accepted, it is easy to justify state inter-
vention in private affairs. 16 At the most basic level, government and
the rule of law are needed to prevent the Hobbesean war of all against
all.17 Beyond this minimal role, regulation can increase social welfare,
broadly speaking, in two ways. First, law can enable people to enter
into and perform mutually beneficial transactions that would be im-
possible otherwise. Second, government can help align private and
social costs and benefits where they would otherwise diverge. The for-
mer rationale underlies the economic analysis of contract law, com-
mercial law, and corporate law, to name a few. The latter motivates
the analysis of tort law, property law, environmental law, and a num-
ber of other legal regimes. Because tax law clearly does not aim to
resolve the problems arising from interpersonal contractual negotia-
tions, the following discussion focuses on the economic solutions to
misalignments of private and social costs and benefits.
The fundamental cause of such misalignments is externalities-
the "effect[s] of one person's decision on someone who is not a party
to that decision."' 8 Externalities may greatly reduce social welfare in
light of substantial transaction costs facing economic actors.' 9 Thus,
legal rules and sanctions are needed to induce rational individuals to
internalize the costs they impose on others when it is too costly for all
13 See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailly to Rational Actors: A Cri-
tique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 23 (1989) (describing how the
rational-actor model "assumes that a person can perfectly process available information
about alternative courses of action, and can rank possible outcomes in order of expected
utility").
14 See Eric A. Posner, Essay, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success
or Failure ?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 833-34 (2003).
15 See id.; Ellickson, supra note 13, at 23.
16 See RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 24 (1988).
17 See THoMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. 13, § 9, at 84 (John Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1998) (1651).
18 COASE, supra note 16.
19 The focus on externalities comes from A.C. Pigou. See ALFRED CECIL PIGOU, THE
EcoNoMICs OF WELFARE 192-203 (4th ed. 1932). The importance of transaction costs in
the persistence of externalities is the contribution of Ronald Coase. See CoASE, supTa note
16, at 15 ("What my argument does suggest is the need to introduce positive transaction
costs explicitly into economic analysis so that we can study the world that exists.").
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involved to negotiate the optimal solution. Once rational actors take
externalities they produce into account, their privately optimal
choices become socially optimal as well. 2 0 This cost-internalization
goal may be accomplished in a variety of ways depending on the costs
of relevant information and enforcement. But in every case, substan-
tive legal rules and sanctions for their violations are considered
jointly. The reason is obvious: the most efficient legal rule would not
improve social welfare if it cannot be enforced.
Law and economics scholars have found that many different legal
regimes may be optimal in various settings. It may be best to adopt a
strict liability system where every harm-producing act gives rise to lia-
bility. Or it may be more efficient to impose sanctions only on actions
that cross a threshold beyond which the marginal external harm of
behavior exceeds its marginal private benefit. It may be optimal to
impose sanctions only after the harm occurs or earlier when a risk of
harm arises. In the former case, sanctions are usually called damages,
and they may be equal to the actual external harm or to the loss sus-
tained by some actors. In the latter case, sanctions reflect the ex-
pected external harm and are referred to as fines, taxes, or penalties.
In addition, given uncertain detection of violations, the so-called dam-
ages multiplier is needed to provide sufficient deterrence, whether
sanctions are based on harm, loss, or risk of harm. 21 Finally, a num-
ber of considerations determine the optimal specificity of legal
rules. 22
Each of the preceding sentences can be easily turned into a book
chapter of detailed analysis. 23 The discussion may become subtle and
some of the conclusions may turn out to be counterintuitive. The
choice between alternative regimes may turn on information that is
not readily available. Taking imperfections of human decisionmaking
into account may make conclusions indeterminate. In other words,
the basic framework does not provide ready solutions for every real-
life problem. Nonetheless, this framework is remarkably powerful in
connecting the most technical legal rules to the fundamental eco-
nomic reasons for government regulation.
20 The insight that in the absence of transaction costs a privately optimal solution
would be socially optimal is known as the Coase Theorem. See Logue & Slemrod, supra
note 7, at 797.
21 For a discussion of this principle and its limitations, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence
and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2185, 2191-92
(1999).
22 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 272 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 562-68 (1992).
23 In fact, this has been done on more than one occasion. For an excellent introduc-
tion to these issues, see A. MITCHELL POUNSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNomics
(3d ed. 2003).
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For instance, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) provides a complex and detailed scheme for managing haz-
ardous waste.24 Regulations under this act are even more complex
and detailed. One of these regulations requires owners and operators
of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to take reasonable care to
keep unauthorized persons from entering the active portion of the
facility where an injury may occur-a requirement usually met by er-
ecting a physical barrier and controlling all access routes, among
other things. 2 5 This provision is an example of a threshold-type, act-
based regime. It is threshold-type because not all harm to third par-
ties leads to sanctions. It is act-based because the rule may be violated
(and the sanctions may be imposed) even if no harm actually occurs.
It does not take long to connect the physical barrier requirement
to the fundamental externality problem. Hazardous waste is danger-
ous to people's health. Unsuspecting third parties may come in con-
tact with hazardous waste if not warned. Without regulation (by
RCRA or the tort law), an owner of a hazardous waste facility will not
take the costs to these third parties into account in designing and op-
erating the facility, producing a negative externality. If full compensa-
tion of injured parties is difficult for any reason, it is better to reduce
the risk of such externality rather than to wait for harm to occur. A
physical barrier requirement is one of many reasonable ways of doing
so. VoildA! This exercise of connecting the specific regulatory rule to
the basic externality problem has a strong Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon
quality.2 6 And it usually does not take six steps to connect the most
technical sub-substatutory provision to the fundamental reason for the
government intervention. 27
This section started with describing the basic assumptions under-
lying economic analysis of law and ended with connecting some of the
fundamental insights of that analysis to a particular provision of a de-
tailed regulatory regime. All of this took about one thousand words.
The basic approach of law and economics clearly has much to offer.
2. My Mat's Good for Environmental Law Isn't Good for Tax
Focusing on what works seems like a good place to start. Why
should the tax inquiry not follow the same logic? Why what's good for
environmental law isn't good for tax?
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (2006).
25 40 C.F.R § 265.14 (2011).
26 For an explanation of the Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon game, see Six Degrees of Kevin
Bacon, WlKlPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SixDegreesofKevin_Bacon (last
updated Jan. 17, 2013).
27 The same is true of sanctions. See infra text accompanying notes 219-23.
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In short, because tax is fundamentally different from pollution
control, traffic regulation, or any other regime whose optimal design
depends on internalizing externalities and minimizing transaction
costs. The analysis of all these regimes begins by positing that private
benefits are also social benefits and private costs are also social costs.
Therefore, when private actors are forced to take all the costs and
benefits of their actions into account, privately optimal conduct be-
comes socially optimal as well.28 Rational individuals acting in their
own self-interest unwittingly-and inescapably-maximize social
welfare.
This identity of private and social benefits and costs does not exist
in the case of intentional, nonconsensual transfers, especially money
transfers. These transfers may take many forms, but the most obvious
one, and the easiest one to consider first, is money theft.
The first important point about theft is that, while the thief real-
izes a private gain and the victim incurs a private loss, these gains and
losses are always equal and offsetting.29 From society's perspective,
money is just moving around. In economic terms, this money move-
ment is a mere transfer-it gives rise to no social cost or benefit.
If so, is there an efficiency-based reason to regulate theft? Most
definitely so, as Gordon Tullock explained in a seminal article.30
While the transfer of money resulting from theft produces no net so-
cial gains or losses, the resulting private gains and losses are very real
to the parties involved. A thief has a strong incentive to expend real
resources to carry out the theft. The victim has an equally strong in-
centive to expend real resources to prevent it. I will refer to all these
expenditures as the transfer costs. For thieves, these costs include ex-
penditures on lock-breaking equipment, on hiding and disposing the
loot, and so on. For victims, the transfer costs include the price of
better locks and surveillance cameras, the value of time spent on
guarding their possessions, and the like.31
All transfer costs are pure social waste. Even if victims are igno-
rant of possible theft, the thief's transfer costs alone make theft so-
cially undesirable (the transfer itself netting out to zero). Of course,
victims are unlikely to be (or remain) ignorant, so they incur the
transfer costs as well. Tullock emphasized that these costs may easily
28 See COASE, supra note 16, at 14.
29 This statement ignores the possibility that the thief's utility gain may exceed the
victim's utility loss due to their different wealth and the declining marginal utility of
money. At least on average, this possibility is unlikely to produce meaningful efficiency
gains for most theft-like activities considered below. For a detailed discussion, see Ras-
kolnikov, supra note 3.
30 Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Taiffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224,
230 (1967).
31 Id. at 230-31.
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surpass the amount of the potential transfer.32 No wonder most socie-
ties have made theft illegal and subjected it to heavy punishment.
What does this have to do with tax law? Quite a bit, as Tullock
himself pointed out.3 3 The first connection is obvious: tax evasion has
a strong resemblance to theft. Evaders essentially steal from the gov-
ernment-that is, from all compliant taxpayers. The transfer costs re-
lated to tax evasion are real social losses, and they are likely to be
substantial. Tax evasion, however, is not the only response to taxation
that gives rise to social costs.
If lawmakers decide to tax oranges, taxpayers will buy fewer or-
anges. If lawmakers choose to tax wages, taxpayers will work less.
With the exception of a lump-sum tax-a fixed levy on each taxpayer
that does not depend on anything the taxpayer does-any tax that can
be implemented in practice leads to behavioral distortions. Taxpayers
change their choices compared to the hypothetical world without
taxes (or, more precisely, the world with a lump-sum tax equal to any
given taxpayer's actual tax burden) in order to reduce their tax liabil-
ity? 4 That reduction in one's tax burden is a money transfer from the
rest of society to the taxpayer, and this transfer gives rise to social
losses-the transfer costs. Working less sounds nothing like tax eva-
sion, but from the economic perspective, the two are very similar. In
each case, taxpayers keep money that would have otherwise gone to
the government. In each case, taxpayers incur transfer costs to retain
more money while the government incurs transfer costs to increase
tax revenues (by expending resources to reduce evasion or behavioral
distortions). And in each case, no socially useful activity takes place.
That is why "from an efficiency point of view, it does not matter
whether or not the underlying activity is legal."35
The transfer costs come in many shapes and sizes. A loss of indi-
vidual utility from choosing a suboptimal course of action in order to
save taxes is the so-called deadweight loss. It arises every time a tax-
payer's decision is tax motivated. Other transfer costs include ex-
penses for lawyers and accountants incurred to minimize one's taxes,
costs of hiding income (offshore or under a mattress), risk-bearing
losses related to taking uncertain tax positions,36 and so on. Whatever
form they take, the transfer costs always reduce social welfare. Their
32 See id. at 231.
33 See id. at 228 (comparing theft to a lump-sum tax).
34 To simplify the exposition going forward, I will omit similar caveats. That is, I will
focus on the substitution effect caused by distortive taxation and ignore the partially or
fully offsetting income effect.
35 Wojciech Kopczuk, Tax Simplification and Tax Compliance: An Economic Perspective, in
BRIDGING THE TAx GAP 112 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 2005).
36 See Kaplow, supra note 9, at 3.
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socially optimal amount is zero, and so is thd socially optimal amount
of tax-motivated decisions giving rise to these costs.
It is now clear why the basic law and economics approach does
not work in tax. That approach is well suited for activities that are
socially desirable at some level. Even though driving leads to auto
accidents and manufacturing produces pollution, social welfare would
certainly not be maximized if we eliminate socially costly accidents
and pollution by prohibiting all driving and all manufacturing. But if
someone invented a vaccine that could be administered to all
newborns to make them completely unresponsive to taxes, that would
create a certain and huge efficiency gain.37 The optimal response to
taxation is no response. The optimal amount of tax-induced behav-
ioral distortions is zero. So, the basic law and economics analysis de-
signed to determine the optimal nonzero amount of an activity
producing both social costs and social benefits has nothing to offer to
tax law and economics.
One may object by pointing out that tax dollars raised by the gov-
ernment are presumably spent in a welfare-increasing manner, such as
by funding public goods. If so, the cost of taxation is connected to the
benefit of public spending, just like the cost of driving is tied to its
benefits. This objection would be misguided. While auto accidents
are indeed the inevitable cost of driving, tax-induced distortions are
not the inevitable cost of providing for public goods. In theory, the
government can raise revenue with an instrument that produces no
distortions-the lump-sum tax. While we may (and do) reject this tax
for good reasons, its availability underscores the fundamental differ-
ence between nonconsensual money transfers and externality-produc-
ing activities. The basic law and economics analysis developed to
optimize the latter is ill suited for optimizing the former.
Before proceeding further, it is important to bracket a particular
kind of taxes. As A.C. Pigou noted almost a hundred years ago, any
activity that may be optimally controlled using rules of legal liability,
damages, and sanctions may be regulated by taxes as well.38 Examples
of cost-internalizing taxes (now called Pigouvian) include the so-
called sin taxes, 9 pollution taxes, 40 and tax incentives of all kinds.41
37 A vaccine against addiction is, apparently, very close. See Douglas Quenqua, An
Addiction Vaccine, Tantalizingly Close, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at Dl.
38 See PiGou, supra note 19, at 192.
39 See, e.g., Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REv. 975, 991 n.86
(2011).
40 See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency VersusJustice, 85
WASH. L. Ruv. 293, 303 (2010).
41 See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk & Andrew L. Grossman, The Failure of Tax Incentives for
Education, 61 TAx L. REv. 295, 308 (2008) (discussing education tax incentives and their
Pigouvian justification).
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Pigouvian taxes are subject to the same general law and economics
analysis that applies to pollution controls and speed limits. The rest of
this Article focuses on taxes that are not Pigouvian. These taxes-
imposed to raise revenue rather than to optimize the level of a partic-
ular externality-producing activity-present the unique problems of
tax law and economics.
3. Searching for a Better Fit
Pigouvian taxes aside, tax-motivated actions are always ineffi-
cient. 4 2 In that, however, they are not unique. The economic analysis
of tax-motivated distortions applies to theft as well. While this is
hardly recognized in the literature, it is even less understood that
these two activities belong to a unique and distinct category of actions.
Other examples include price fixing and bid rigging, insider trading
and market manipulation, churning and scalping, embezzlement and
option backdating.45 All these acts are intentional, nonconsensual
money transfers subject to Tullock's analysis of theft. All are irre-
deemably inefficient for the reasons already discussed. And all are
different from pollution, speeding, and similar externality-producing
activities that can be made efficient by forcing actors to account for
the external harms they produce. Theft-like activities may not be
made efficient in a similar fashion (or in any other manner). That is
why I call them irredeemably inefficient (or just irredeemable) acts.4 4
While almost all irredeemable acts are illegal, the law's distaste
for these acts is measured. They are subject to rules that could be
broadened (that is, expanded to cover more possible irredeemable
acts) and to sanctions that could be increased. The law's restraint has
a clear efficiency rationale. I will use price fixing and churning as
examples to demonstrate this point that applies to all irredeemable
acts.
So-called "naked" price fixing is a coordinated price increase by
competitors that is "unrelated to any organization of production or
distribution."45 It is an intentional, nonconsensual transfer of money
from consumers to the colluding firms-a transfer clearly incompati-
ble with the ideal baseline of a perfectly competitive economy. Price
fixing leads to deadweight loss because it distorts consumer choice by
encouraging consumers to substitute away from the items subject to
42 Needless to say, if the tax collector dumps the revenues he collects into the ocean,
tax-motivated acts are socially desirable as they preclude a senseless destruction of value
(the taxpayers' wellbeing is reduced without an offsetting benefit to anyone). The taxation
problem in this case is entirely uninteresting, however, as the optimal solution for everyone
is to pay zero taxes and for the government to disappear.
43 For a discussion, see Raskolnikov, supra note 3, at 12-16.
44 Id. at 2-3.
45 HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 195.
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the price fixing. It also gives rise to other transfer costs that are the
primary focus of Tullock's original analysis.4 6 Price fixing is an irre-
deemably inefficient act, it is always welfare reducing, and its optimal
amount is zero. Yet the law hesitates. It only condemns price in-
creases that result from an "agreement" to fix prices.47 The term
"agreement" probably does not extend to implicit understandings and
certainly does not reach conscious parallelism.48 Why so?
Simply put, because prices may increase for many reasons, and
most of these reasons have nothing to do with collusion. If demand
rises or input costs increase, all firms in the industry will raise prices
even if the market is perfectly competitive. Mistakenly labeling com-
petitive price elevations as oligopolistic (irredeemable) acts and sub-
jecting them to sanctions will inhibit competition, reducing social
welfare. Yet such mislabeling is inevitable given real-world imperfect
enforcement. I refer to the social welfare loss resulting from such mis-
labeling as the mislabeling cost.49 Broader legal rules and greater sanc-
tions for price fixing would deter it to a greater extent, reducing its
social cost (and giving rise to the deterrence benefit) but increasing
the mislabeling cost. An optimizing policymaker would design the
price-fixing rules and sanctions while taking account of both the mar-
ginal benefit of greater deterrence and the marginal increase in the
mislabeling cost.50
This analysis is known-though hardly well articulated-in the
literature.5 1 It is also incomplete because any increase in deterrence
leads not only to a greater mislabeling cost but also to a greater trans-
fer cost from undeterred irredeemable acts. It is easy to engage in
price fixing if competing firms can comply with the law by simply not
signing a collusive contract. It is much costlier to fix prices if the only
way to avoid liability is to have no communications with other poten-
tial cartel members.52 Needless to say, there will be fewer price-fixing
46 See Tullock, supra note 30, at 228-32.
47 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 166-67.
48 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) ("[M]ere interdependence
of basic price decisions is not conspiracy."); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) (stating that 'conscious parallelism" is "not in itself
unlawful").
49 While Louis Kaplow uses the term "chilling cost" to refer to the same concept, see,
e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUsT L.J. 343, 366-70,
414-16 (2011), that term is frequently used to refer to any cost of over-deterrence, usually
while discussing acts that are not irredeemably inefficient. The term "mislabeling cost," in
contrast, highlights the mislabeling problem that is particularly important (if not unique)
for regulation of irredeemable acts.
50 See id. at 346, 415. In addition, the policymaker will take into account the "costs of
operating the [regulatory] regime." See id. at 346.
51 See id. at 366 ("The chilling of desirable behavior is a concern that strongly moti-
vates past discussions of price-fixing rules but almost always remains implicit .. . .").
52 For a more detailed and realistic example making the same point, see id. at 361.
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conspiracies in the latter case. Nevertheless, there will be some, and
the undeterred conspirators will incur high transfer costs. This "bad
things getting worse" effect of stronger deterrence is often ignored in
the competition law literature.53 There is not even a term to describe
the cost of this phenomenon. I will refer to it as the resistance cost,
alluding to the undeterred offenders who resist the government's ef-
forts to eliminate irredeemable acts.5 4
Churning-trading by securities brokers in order to enrich them-
selves rather than to benefit their clients-is subject to the same analy-
sis. 5 6 Churning gives rise to a deadweight loss and other transfer costs
because clients hire fewer brokers and give the brokers they hire less
discretion out of fear of churning. This undermines the efficiency of
capital markets. While churning is always welfare reducing, it is illegal
only if it is "excessive."56 Expanding this limitation, for instance by
adopting a rule that a client's accusation of churning is sufficient for a
broker's conviction, would surely deter more churning, especially if
the rule is accompanied by a hefty fine. But this expansion will also
give rise to a large mislabeling cost. Honest brokers whose services
support an efficient capital market would abandon discretionary trad-
ing to avoid being mistakenly held liable for churning. Moreover, the
few intransigent brokers will incur high resistance costs as they strive
to keep their churning undetected.
These examples reveal the structure of the economic approach to
designing optimal legal rules and sanctions for irredeemably ineffi-
cient acts-the structure that is quite different from the analysis of
pollution, speeding, and the like. First, the analyst defines the ideal
baseline. In antitrust, it is perfect competition; in securities regula-
53 Kaplow does allude to some instances of the "bad things getting worse" phenome-
non in his recent work, but he neither generalizes his examples nor incorporates them in
the basic tradeoff underlying his analysis. See id. at 361 (noting that "successful interdepen-
dent oligopoly pricing can be worse than old-fashioned explicit cartels because the latter
might be able to rationalize production and thus achieve some efficiencies that will not
result from mere coordinated price elevation"); cf id. at 346 ("An economic approach to
regulating oligopolistic price elevation .. . seeks to determine liability and apply sanctions
based primarily on the deterrence benefits that result as well as any chilling of desirable
behavior that may arise, in addition to the costs of operating the regime."). It does not
appear that Kaplow includes the transfer costs incurred by undeterred oligopolists in the
"costs of operating the regime." Id.
54 It is worth noting that risk-bearing losses-costs incurred by undeterred offend-
ers-are wellknown in the literature. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 9, at 9. These losses are
one component of the resistance cost. However, that cost includes many other
components.
55 See Louis Loss & JoEt SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1097
(5th ed. 2004).
56 See, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). For a
discussion, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 1097-1101.
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tion, it is the efficient capital market.57 Second, the analyst singles out
irredeemable acts. Third, she identifies activities that are part of the
ideal baseline but that generate outcomes similar to those produced
by irredeemable acts. These are the activities that will be occasionally
mislabeled as irredeemably inefficient and increasingly burdened by
stronger deterrence. Finally, the analyst sets the optimal legal rules
and sanctions by balancing the marginal benefit of greater deterrence
of irredeemable acts and the marginal mislabeling and resistance
costs.5 8 Because tax-motivated actions are irredeemable acts, the same
approach should be much more useful in the tax setting than are in-
quiries focused on externalities and transaction costs. And it is, but
only to a point.
4. The Undeterrability Problem
In one respect, the analysis of tax rules and sanctions is simpler
than the economic analysis of other irredeemably inefficient acts. In
another respect, however, it is much more complex.
The simplicity is due to the fact that the mislabeling cost is absent
in the tax setting. That cost is the cost of deterring a socially desirable
activity that looks similar to an irredeemable act. Recall that in the tax
setting, the irredeemable act is a distorted, tax-motivated decision-a
decision that would have been different if the tax did not apply. Its
benign counterpart is an act that would not have changed whether the
tax burden were present or not. By definition, that benign act cannot
be deterred by a threat that the tax would be imposed on it due to a
mistaken conclusion that the act is tax-motivated (irredeemable).
Granted, the mislabeling cost reemerges if we introduce penalties for
tax underpayments. But in the basic scenario, this cost does not exist.
The resistance cost, however, presents a problem because it does
not vary in the same predictable manner as it does for other irredeem-
able acts. A few examples will demonstrate this point. Consider a bro-
ker who wants to churn her customers' accounts. If churning is illegal
but very difficult to prove (or if the sanctions are very low), the broker
would take some care to avoid liability, but the cost of this care (the
resistance cost) plus the expected sanction would be small compared
to the benefit of extra fees. As the anti-churning rule is made increas-
ingly more difficult to evade (or as the sanctions for churning in-
crease), the point is reached when the gamble is not worth it for the
57 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 19 ("The social cost of monopoly is the differ-
ence in social value between a monopolized market and a competitive market. It is not the
difference in social value between a monopolized market and no market at all.").
58 Needless to say, the cost of enforcing legal rules and penalties should also be taken
into account, just as it should when regulating speeding, pollution, and other externality-
producing activities.
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broker and she decides not to churn. At this point, the deterrence
benefit arises, the resistance cost becomes zero, but the mislabeling
cost is relatively large. When more than one broker contemplates
churning, the point at which compliance becomes privately optimal
need not be the same for all brokers, and it will certainly not be opti-
mal to assure full compliance by all brokers because the mislabeling
cost will be extremely high in that case. But if we really wanted to
deter all churning, we could do so.59 Once this is clear, we can decide
what level short of full compliance is socially optimal while keeping
the mislabeling and resistance costs in mind.
Consider now a taxpayer who holds an appreciated security that
she would like to sell, except that she does not want to pay the tax that
would be due upon the sale. If the taxpayer can easily replicate the
economic effect of a sale without actually selling-say, by engaging in
a short-against-the-box trade-she will incur the resistance cost of
learning about this trade or, more likely, hiring someone who can ad-
vise her about it. The tax-motivated irredeemable act (the decision to
retain the unwanted security) will not be deterred (the deterrence
benefit will not materialize). The act's social cost (the cost of lost tax
revenue) will arise, but the taxpayer will incur only a small resistance
cost.
Of course, Congress can pass a law treating the short-against-the-
box trade as an actual sale, eliminating an easy-that is, low cost-
strategy of avoiding the tax (it did).60 But other, more costly strate-
gies may emerge. Tax planners may develop partial hedges that will
allow taxpayers to keep only a fraction of the undesirable economic
exposure while avoiding the tax on the gain (they did).61 Tax lawyers
may then decide (as they did) that as long as a taxpayer retains, say,
ten percent of the original economic exposure, the partial hedge
"works" (allows the taxpayer to avoid the tax while eliminating most of
the economic exposure to the appreciated security). Entering into
these hedges will require more documentation and higher fees. Be-
sides, these hedges will not put the taxpayer in the most desirable po-
sition because they will not eliminate all of her economic exposure.
The taxpayer's resistance cost will increase without any offsetting de-
terrence benefit (no tax revenue is collected).
Congress can then focus on these partial hedges (or on penalties
for engaging in partial hedges that ultimately lose in court). It may
59 The point that high enough sanctions lead to full (though not necessarily socially
optimal) compliance is well understood in the optimal deterrence literature. See, e.g.,
Kaplow, supra note 9, at 3 ("In some cases, complete deterrence may be optimal in light of
the benefits of eliminating all risk-bearing costs.").
60 See I.R.C. § 1259 (2006).
61 For a discussion, see David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 1312, 1345-59 (2001).
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decide, for instance, that keeping only ten percent of the economic
exposure is insufficient to avoid a realization of gain. Nothing would
stop Congress from defining a partial hedge that "works" as leaving
the taxpayer with twenty, fifty, or even ninety percent of the economic
exposure, forcing taxpayers to move farther and farther away from
their preferred tax avoidance strategy. At some point, the private ben-
efit from tax savings will be certainly outweighed by the cost of hiring
lawyers, entering into complicated partial hedge transactions, and liti-
gating them in court. Just like in the churning example, tax-moti-
vated hedging will be deterred fully, and the resistance costs of hiring
advisers and executing partial hedges will be eliminated.62
The same is not necessarily true, however, of another resistance
cost component-the deadweight loss. That is because instead of de-
ciding to abandon the wasteful hedging effort, sell the security, and
pay the tax (the equivalent of a broker's decision to abstain from
churning), the taxpayer may decide to forgo the sale altogether. This
would be the most costly tax-avoidance strategy. If it were not, the
taxpayer would have chosen it over increasingly unsatisfactory partial
hedging long before Congress dramatically expanded the partial
hedging rule. Nonetheless, as long as the private cost of forgoing the
sale is less than the private cost of paying the tax, the taxpayer will not
sell.
Availability of this last-resort option of forgoing the sale reveals a
fundamental problem. We can be certain that stronger deterrence of
tax-motivated hedging will eventually deter all such hedging, just like
stronger deterrence of churning will eventually deter all churning.
But it is altogether unclear whether full deterrence of tax-motivated
hedging will eliminate the resistance cost and give rise to the deter-
rence benefit, while it is certain that full deterrence of churning will
do so.
This is not because a broker deterred from churning will necessa-
rily become a faithful agent of his customer. Brokers have other ways
of cheating customers (cherry-picking is one example),63 and a broker
deterred by anti-churning rules may try those other ways instead. Sim-
ilarly, a taxpayer deterred from tax-free hedging may try other poten-
62 Daniel Shaviro made a similar point while speaking about "total transaction costs"
of tax-motivated deals. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary, Evaluating the Social Costs of
Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REv. 445, 446-48 (2002). Shaviro did not define the term
"total transaction costs," but he appeared to use this term as a synonym of a previously
defined term "tax planning costs" that include the "cost to promoters and taxpayers of
developing, marketing, and executing the strategies," as well as "taxpayer and government
costs of audit and litigation incurred by reason of the use of these strategies." Id. at 446.
63 See, e.g., SEC v. K.W. Brown & Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1303-04 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(explaining that cherry-picking occurs when a broker trades alongside her customers and
takes advantage of the cheapest execution prices while burdening the customers with the
least favorable ones).
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tially nontaxable diversification strategies such as entering into so-
called "mixing bowl" partnerships.64 Needless to say, the government
may then address those alternatives as well. It can stop cherry-picking
just like it can stop churning. It can stop mixing bowls just like it can
stop tax-free hedging. In other words, the government can try to de-
ter all irredeemably inefficient acts in either setting.
But while the government may succeed in that pursuit in the se-
curities regulation arena at least in theory, it cannot possibly succeed
in tax. This is because the taxpayer may engage in irredeemable, tax-
motivated acts that cannot be made illegal. To repeat an earlier ex-
ample, if lawmakers decide to tax oranges, taxpayers will buy fewer
oranges. If lawmakers choose to tax wages, taxpayers will work less.
For obvious reasons, making not buying an extra orange and not work-
ing an extra hour illegal is not a viable policy option. Yet both of
these responses to taxation are irredeemable acts. Clearly, it is impos-
sible to deter them, even in theory. In that sense, tax-motivated acts
are undeterrable.
This undeterrability problem exists for a very basic reason: rational
individuals respond to incentives, including those created by law. In
every other setting, the very reason for enacting efficiency-maximizing
legal rules is to initiate such responses.6 5 This is true whether the rule
addresses irredeemable acts or aims at negative externalities and
whether it tackles commissions or omissions. But a tax is perfectly
efficient only if it leads taxpayers to not respond to it. Yet, as long as
the tax is imposed on something that the government cannot per-
fectly observe, persuading private actors to ignore incentives inevitably
created by a tax regime is an impossible task.66 If so, the socially unde-
sirable phenomenon-taxpayers' responses to taxation-may never
be fully deterred.
Another way to illustrate the undeterrability problem is to imag-
ine how the government could deploy its generally successful social
optimization approach in the tax setting. Many potentially harmful
activities are regulated by a standard, such as reasonableness. 6 7 At
least in the law and economics interpretation, this standard serves as a
proxy for the relevant cost-benefit inquiry.68 For instance, the reason-
64 See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden & Douglas L. Longhofer, The Effect of Like-Kind Property
on the Section 704(c) Anti-Mixing Bowl Rules, 27 RFAL EsT. J. 131, 131 (2011).
65 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 22, at 260; Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistrib-
uting Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAx L. REv. 157, 159 (2003).
66 The government cannot recognize inefficient, tax-motivated decisions because it
cannot resolve a counterfactual inquiry into what each taxpayer would have done in the
absence of tax (short of subjecting every taxpayer to a lie detector tests and testing every
decision that may possibly affect tax liability-and there are a lot of those!).
67 See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 22, at 261.
68 See id. at 258, 277.
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able care standard of tort law implies a comparison between the ex-
pected costs of accidents and the costs of taking precaution.69 A
decisionmaker's conclusion about the likely balance of costs and ben-
efits in a particular case comes from observing others engaged in a
comparable potentially harmful activity. A similar reasoning applies
to the motorist who must drive at a reasonable speed, the employer
who must provide reasonable accommodations to the disabled, the
broker who must execute a reasonable (not excessive) number of
trades, and so on. Suppose the government imposes a tax on labor
income and realizes that this tax creates inefficient private incentives
to work less. Can anyone seriously suggest to counter these incentives
by legally requiring taxpayers to work a reasonable number of hours?
What cost-benefit calculus would underlie this inquiry? Which taxpay-
ers would provide the relevant comparison?
It is worth repeating that some tax anti-avoidance rules do suc-
ceed in deterring certain tax-motivated responses.70 The limited suc-
cess of these rules does not negate the undeterrability problem. Some
responses to taxation can be deterred. All such responses never can
be.
In sum, the intuitive tradeoff underlying the optimal regulation
of price fixing, churning, and other irredeemably inefficient acts does
not apply in the tax setting. The undeterrability problem reveals that
the relation between the deterrence benefit and the mislabeling and
resistance costs is profoundly unclear in tax. While tax-motivated acts
are much more similar to price fixing and churning than they are to
speeding and polluting, they are not similar enough.
B. The Redistribution Problem
The undeterrability problem may startle an analyst used to think-
ing about traffic safety and environmental protection, but to a public
finance economist, it is old news.71 The economic theory of taxation
recognized and solved this problem long ago. The solution is quite
radical. Given that one cannot deter all tax-motivated responses, one
should make them impossible. The only way to do this is to construct
69 See id. at 277. This comparison is captured in the famous Learned Hand formula.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
70 One such rule (the anti-hedging rule discussed above) successfully deters at least
some tax-free hedging while relying on concepts similar to reasonableness in their vague-
ness. These concepts include "substantially fixed," I.R.C. § 1259(d) (1) (2006), and "sub-
stantially all," id. § 1259(d)(2). Another rule, the "reasonable compensation" test,
discussed below, expressly embraces the reasonableness standard. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 95-99.
71 The point that this problem is what separates tax from other irredeemably ineffi-
cient acts, however, is part of this Article's contribution.
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a tax system in which the tax burden does not depend on anything a
taxpayer does. This tax system is wellknown: it is the lump-sum tax.7 2
The uniform lump-sum tax is perfectly efficient, very easy to ad-
minister, and wholly unattractive as a policy prescription.73 Its funda-
mental limitation is that it cannot be used for redistribution.74 This
self-evident statement highlights a major burden of the tax system, a
major challenge for its designers, and a major reason for the limits of
tax law and economics.
According to the prevailing view in law and economics,75 design-
ers of legal rules (especially rules affecting commerce and finance)
should focus only on efficiency maximization.7 6 If the tax system
could be designed in the same way-if, for instance, there was some
other regime (say, insurance law) that would carry the redistribution
burden-then uniform lump-sum tax would be a perfect solution.
Alas, no such other system exists in practice or in theory. Moreover,
the main argument supporting the view that tort law, corporate law,
and contract law, for instance, should focus solely on efficiency is that
redistribution is better accomplished through the tax system. In es-
sence, the nontax law and economic scholars affirmatively place the
burden of assuring appropriate redistribution on tax policy design-
ers.77 Yet, the need to provide for redistribution-the redistribution
problem-immensely complicates the tax analysis. At the most basic
72 See N. Gregory Mankiw et al., Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice, 23 J. ECoN.
PERSP. 147, 149 (2009).
73 See id.
74 This is true because a uniform tax imposes the same tax burden on every taxpayer.
A non-uniform lump-sum tax based on each taxpayer's ability (also known as the endow-
ment tax) is redistributive, but it is so unrealistic that it is virtually impossible to make
comparisons to it. See David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability Taxation, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1057,
1058 (2007).
75 See Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of Redistributive Taxation:
Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REv. 1, 2 (2005) ("That
'[r]edistribution is accomplished more efficiently through the income tax system than
through the use of legal rules' seems to be the prevailing norm in the law and economics
literature . . . ."); Logue & Avraham, supra note 65, at 158 (making a similar statement).
76 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 821
(2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 675 (1994). But see Blumkin & Mar-
galioth, supra note 75, at 2; Logue & Avraham, supra note 65, at 160; Terrance O'Reilly,
Principles of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX REv. 583, 597-600 (2008); Chris Wil-
liam Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 797, 797 (2000).
7 Even the commentators who believe that legal rules should take distributional con-
sequences into account to some extent and under some circumstances share the view that
the tax system should be the primary (or at least substantial) redistributive mechanism. See
Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 75, at 2, 29; Logue & Avraham, supra note 65, at 166-67;
Sanchirico, supra note 76, at 804.
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level, it rules out the uniform lump-sum tax. Without this tax, the
undeterrability problem cannot be solved.
Despite the unique complexity of the tax optimization challenge,
public finance economists found an ingenious solution. They devel-
oped a theory that addresses both of the seemingly insurmountable
obstacles just considered: the undeterrability problem and the redis-
tribution problem. That theory is the focus of the analysis in the re-
mainder of this Part.
C. The Baseline Problem
1. The Optimal Income Tax Solution
The ingenious solution is the optimal income tax theory based on
the seminal work ofJames Mirrlees. 78 If there is one canonical, widely
accepted theory of optimal taxation, Mirrlees's theory is it.'' It has
been developed and extended by numerous scholars. Its fundamental
conclusion that the optimal tax is a progressive, nonlinear tax on la-
bor income is as widely accepted in public economics as any. And the
argument that this tax is superior to all alternative tax systems has
survived for over four decades without widespread dissent.80
The basic optimal income tax model has many well-known limita-
tions. It is static and, therefore, has no savings and no wealth transfers
at death.81 Individuals are assumed to be identical in all respects ex-
cept for their earning ability.8 2 The argument about the superiority of
the model's tax over any other tax relies on assumptions that are not
particularly realistic.8 3 And the key part of the prescription (the sub-
78 See James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
REv. EcoN. STUD. 175, 175-76 (1971).
79 See, e.g., Mankiw et al., supra note 72, at 150 ("[T]he Mirrlees approach ... has
become the dominant approach for tax theorists."); Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and
Optimal Tax Systems, 4J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 157 (1990) ("The theory of optimal taxation has
. . . been the reigning normative approach to taxation.").
80 In the past decade, the dissent appears to be on the rise, however. See Peter A.
Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recom-
mendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 181-83 (2011).
81 See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Theory of Optimal Commodity and Income Taxation: An
Introduction, in THE THEORY OF TAXATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRiEs 22, 37 (David M.
Newbery & Nicholas Stern eds., 1987). Extensions of the basic model to multiple periods
have not yielded well-accepted policy prescriptions. See Louis KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF
TAXATION AND PuBLIc EcONOMics 221-30 (2008).
82 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 81, at 36. In other words, the possibility that some indi-
viduals like chocolate ice cream while others prefer vanilla (or, more importantly, that
high ability individuals may have different preferences from low ability types) is disallowed
by the model.
83 These assumptions are that utility is weakly separable in consumption and leisure
and that all taxpayers are identical except for variation in their wage rate. See, e.g., Dia-
mond & Saez, supra note 80, at 180. The weak separability means, inter alia, that there are
no such things as leisure substitutes or complements. That is, fishing rods and downhill
skis are not associated with leisure more than, say, office clothes and take-out lunches. It
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stantial demogrant) is not going to be implemented until public fi-
nance economists gain full control of the government. Nonetheless,
the optimal income tax theory is the best public economics has to
offer. It is the most reasonable choice for the ideal baseline.
The optimal income tax theory embraces the redistribution chal-
lenge. It also accepts the undeterrability problem, that is, the inevita-
bility of distortions and deadweight losses. The theory's main focus is
on optimizing the tradeoff between redistribution and distortion.84
In the basic setup, redistribution is desirable because taxpayers
are assumed to have declining marginal utility of income.85 Redistrib-
uting from high-income taxpayers to low-income taxpayers increases
overall welfare because the latter gain more utility from the transfer
than the former lose.86 If this were the only consideration, a utilita-
rian social welfare function (SWF) would call for complete equality of
incomes. The reason it does not (and neither does any other SWF) is
that taxing labor income of high-income earners induces them to
work less-their choice between labor and leisure is distorted in favor
of leisure.87 The resulting deadweight loss offsets the benefit of redis-
tribution, giving rise to the optimal tax system consisting of a fixed
cash grant to each taxpayer (the so-called demogrant) and a schedule
of constant or declining marginal rates.88 The overall system is pro-
gressive, however, because average rates rise with income.89
Because the optimal income tax theory addresses both the redis-
tribution and the undeterrability problem, it allows us to make an-
other attempt to follow the general economic approach to regulating
irredeemable acts. Up to this point, the discussion implicitly assumed
the lump-sum tax as the ideal baseline. Every tax-motivated decision
was viewed as a deviation from the ideal. That approach faltered in
also means that when two taxpayers with equal income choose to spend it in different ways
(say, one buys a modest car and a house in an excellent public school district while another
buys a luxurious car and a house in a mediocre public school district), their choices convey
no information about their respective abilities. For reasons to question this assumption,
see sources cited infra note 242.
84 See, e.g., Mankiw et al., supra note 72, at 150.
85 While this assumption, as well as the assumption that all individuals have the same
utility function, is widely accepted in public economics, its empirical foundations are weak.
See Daniel Friedman & Shyam Sunder, Risky Curves: From Unobservable Utility to Observable
Opportunity Sets 2 (Cowles Foundation, Discussion Paper No. 1819, 2011), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=1858769. The declining marginal utility of income assumption is un-
necessary, however, if the social planner is assumed to have any social welfare function that
is more egalitarian than the utilitarian one, or if the planner assigns different individuals
different welfare weights.
86 See Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of
the Income Tax, 49 NAT'L TAx J. 135, 137 (1996).
87 See id.
88 SeeJoseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1945 (1987).
89 See id.
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light of the undeterrability problem. What if we adopt the optimal
income tax as the ideal baseline instead?
This baseline would be different from every baseline considered
thus far (the lump-sum tax included) because the optimal income tax
baseline incorporates a distortion. Given that baseline, tax-motivated
reductions in labor effort are not irredeemable acts because, by defini-
tion, they are part of the ideal base case. With the labor-leisure distor-
tion addressed by the choice of baseline, developing legal rules and
sanctions aimed at reducing the same distortion is unnecessary (as
well as impossible). All other tax-induced distortions, however, are
welfare reducing irredeemable acts. We can study legal rules and
sanctions aimed at deterring them in the usual fashion.
Because the optimal income tax is a nonlinear tax on labor in-
come, taxpayers subject to this tax have three ways of reducing their
tax burdens other than by working less. They can cheat, for example,
by failing to report their wages to the government. They can disguise
their labor income as capital income (which is not burdened by the
ideal income tax). Or they can shift their income to other taxpayers
who are subject to lower marginal tax rates.
Any tax lawyer can immediately recognize that the analysis is start-
ing to get traction at this point. Underreporting of wages, recasting of
wages as capital income, and income shifting among taxpayers are all
wellknown problems of real-life tax planning and tax administration.o
I will focus on the labor-capital distortion to avoid repetition.
The U.S. tax system gives rise to this distortion for two reasons.
First, Social Security taxes apply only to labor income.9' Second, capi-
tal income in the form of long-term capital gains is taxed at a lower
rate than the top marginal rate for ordinary income such as salaries
and wages.92 The former disparity has led to a controversy involving
compensation of owner-employees of so-called S corporations.93 The
latter is responsible for a host of rules dealing with incentive compen-
sation as well as to the latest debate about the taxation of carried inter-
est earned by private equity managers.94 Because the Social Security
tax is the kind of labor income tax contemplated by the optimal in-
90 See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REv. 215, 222 (2002).
91 Specifically, they apply to "remuneration for employment." I.R.C. § 3121 (a)
(2006).
92 Compare id. §1(a) (marginal rates for ordinary income), with id. §1(h) (lower rates
for long-term capital gains). Dividends are also taxed at a reduced rate at the moment.
93 See Kirsten Harrington, Employment Taxes: What Can the Small Businessman Do?, 10
AKRON TAx J. 61, 70 (1993).
94 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3-7 (2008); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in
Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REv. 715, 715-20 (2009).
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come tax literature, the following discussion focuses on the S corpora-
tion controversy.
That controversy has arisen because when an entrepreneur struc-
tures her business as a wholly owned S corporation, she has a strong
incentive to minimize her compensation and to distribute cash out of
the corporation to herself as a dividend. 5 Wages are subject to the
Social Security tax but dividends are not, hence the incentive to dis-
guise the former as the latter.96 The courts have adopted the "reason-
able compensation" test to determine whether the salary paid by an S
corporation to its owner-employee is adequate (that is, whether no
part of labor income has been shifted to capital income distributed as
a dividend).97
This test can be analyzed in the same fashion as the "agreement"
requirement for price fixing and the "excessive trading" threshold for
churning. If we broaden the "reasonable compensation" test-for in-
stance by changing it to a "reasonably high" or just "high" compensa-
tion standard-more owner-employees who understate their
compensation for tax reasons would lose the benefit of their tax plan-
ning. That is, more irredeemably inefficient acts would be deterred.
On the other hand, some owner-employees who set their compensa-
tion without thinking about taxes would be forced to pay the Social
Security tax on part of their dividend income mislabeled as compensa-
tion. That is, a broad "high" compensation test would impose a
greater tax burden on capital income. That burden is inefficient be-
cause capital income tax is not part of the ideal baseline. Therefore,
the "high" compensation standard would give rise to a larger mislabel-
ing cost compared to the existing "reasonable compensation" test.
The resistance cost would also change in exactly the same manner as
was described earlier while discussing churning brokers.98 In fact, the
tax compliance literature appears to be the only area of law and eco-
nomics where the importance of the resistance cost is well under-
stood.9 Balancing the marginal benefit of deterrence (the social
95 See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 93, at 61-79; Waliter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Sub-
chapters K and S-Just Do It, 62 TAX LAw. 745, 798-801 (2008).
96 See Harrington, supra note 93, at 70. Employment taxes are paid in part by the
employer and in part by the employee. See id. at 61-62. Where the corporation's sole
owner happens to be its only employee, that division becomes extremely tenuous.
9 See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008, 1016-18 (8th Cir. 2012).
98 See supra text accompanying note 59. That is, broad enough rules will deter all
character conversion.
9 While the phenomenon giving rise to the resistance cost has no accepted name
even in that literature, it has been referred to as the "shelters getting worse" problem,
Weisbach, supra note 90, at 237, the "distortionary effect," David A. Weisbach, An Economic
Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 88, 100 (2002), and the
"boomerang effect," Mark P. Gergen, The Logic ofDeterrence Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L.
REv. 255, 279 (2002). The costs reflecting some components of the resistance cost have
been referred to as the "dissipation costs," Philip A. Curry et al., Creating Failures in the
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benefit of additional tax revenue) and the marginal mislabeling and
resistance costs would enable a policymaker to set the optimal legal
rule regarding compensation of S corporation owner-employees.
The same analysis applies to evaluating how much of private eq-
uity managers' carried interest should be subject to ordinary income
rates and whether some shifting of labor income among taxpayers
should be allowed. In the former case, the mislabeling cost arises due
to an imposition of tax on capital income; in the latter, due to a devia-
tion from the optimal nonlinear schedule of marginal tax rates.
The cost-benefit analysis just described would also guide policy-
makers in designing the sanctioning regime. For instance, increasing
penalties for violating the "reasonable compensation" test would deter
more S corporation owner-employees from understating their com-
pensation, just like replacing "reasonable" with "high" compensation
test would do. The tradeoff between the deterrence benefits and the
mislabeling and resistance costs is exactly the same.
Is this the answer? Can we rethink the design of optimal tax rules
and sanctions by following the analytical path illuminated by the eco-
nomic analysis of irredeemable acts suggested above? Unfortunately,
no such rethinking can occur. The baseline is at the root of the
problem.
2. The Baseline Problem
The optimal income tax baseline is clearly closer to the actual tax
system than the lump-sum tax baseline could ever be. But it is not
close enough. Only a tiny fraction of the actual tax rules may be ex-
plained by reference to the optimal income tax baseline. At the same
time, the fundamental features of our tax system lack any connection
to it.100
The optimal income tax is a tax on labor income. Yet, the Inter-
nal Revenue Code imposes taxes on capital income as well. How can
we analyze the details of capital income tax rules if any such tax is a
violation of the ideal baseline? This is hardly the only problem. Our
capital income tax is transaction-based due to the realization require-
ment. That requirement leads to numerous distortions in the choice
of capital investments. Besides, one form of realization-based capital
Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAx REV. 943, 948 (2007), "the inframarginal cost[s] of
evasion," Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. PUB.
ECON. 221, 233 (1990), the "avoidance costs" combined with the "deadweight loss that
results when taxpayers switch to untaxed transactions," Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency
Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAx L. REv. 503, 515-16 (2004), and, seem-
ingly interchangeably, the "tax planning cost" and the "transaction cost," Shaviro, supra
note 62, at 446, 448.
100 In Kaplow's words, "there is little basis for supposing that a conventional income
tax is even approximately optimal." KAPLow, supra note 81, at 232.
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income-that earned by the so-called C corporations-is subject to a
double tax, at least in theory. And corporate income (as well as other
capital income) earned in a cross-border setting is taxed under its own
set of rules.
Suppose we consider the optimal rule for allocating interest ex-
pense by U.S. multinational corporations. In undertaking this task,
we would be so far from the optimal income tax baseline that the
effort to reference it would be decidedly doomed. There is no opti-
mal theory of international taxation (there is not even an agreement
on whether national or worldwide welfare should be the subject of
optimization). There is no optimal theory of corporate tax, no opti-
mal theory of the realization requirement, and no optimal theory of
capital income taxation.101 In considering interest expense allocation
rules, we would be four levels removed from the optimal labor income
tax, and each level appears to be completely impenetrable to op-
timization, at least for now.
In light of these challenges, it is no surprise that attempts by tax
law and economics scholars to devise an approach to optimizing ac-
tual tax rules and sanctions are exceedingly rare. While many legal
academics use economic tools to analyze the existing tax system, al-
most none of these analyses are grounded in any kind of an optimal
regime. 0 2 There is simply no tax literature addressing the main in-
quiry of the general law and economics movement.
Louis Kaplow and David Weisbach have each tried to connect the
vast theory of public economics to the task of optimizing tax rules and
sanctions that exist in the real world. Each has made progress, but
neither has ultimately succeeded.
Kaplow's approach begins with a social welfare function fully re-
flecting society's distributive preferences. This function has a certain
value given any set of legal rules and the extent of their enforce-
ment. 03 We then evaluate an adjustment. For instance, we consider
making the rules more complex in order to distinguish between de-
ductible business and nondeductible personal expenses or to include
101 For a description of promising recent research, see infra text accompanying notes
240-43.
102 See, e.g., Logue, supra note 8, at 246-47 (analyzing the efficiency of tax penalties
while assuming that the underlying rules are optimal without investigating this assump-
tion); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 570-74 (2006) (arguing for reforming penalties
without investigating optimality of the rules the penalties enforce); Daniel N. Shaviro, An
Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAx L.
REv. 1, 6 (1992) (concluding that "whether by accident or design, the realization and rec-
ognition rules in the Code have some tendency to promote efficiency" while stopping far
short of asserting that these rules are part of the optimal tax system).
103 See Kaplow, supra note 86, at 136.
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the value of certain fringe benefits in income.10 4 The greater the
complexity and the precision of the tax system, the closer we are to
the ultimate goal of maximizing the value of the SWF. Lack of preci-
sion has equity and/or efficiency costs that can be measured by com-
paring the SWF values of less and more precise systems as well as by
undertaking the standard deadweight loss analysis.105 But complexity
is costly as well.' 0 6 By comparing the costs of complexity and the in-
crease in the SWF value and/or the reduction in deadweight loss from
greater precision, we can decide whether a more complex system is
worth achieving. 07 Analysis of enforcement follows the same path.108
Kaplow does not say whether this approach can be used to reach
the optimal system or only to consider whether certain changes would
be welfare increasing. He explains that the optimal income tax frame-
work, "which has been employed successfully to analyze the problem
of the optimal extent and form of redistribution, can be used to illu-
minate the problems of complexity and enforcement."109 Assuming
optimization is possible, Kaplow's approach could be summarized in
the following four steps: choose the SWF, consider alternative legal
regimes, ascertain the respective SWF values for these alternative re-
gimes in light of the cost of achieving each, pick the one with the
highest value net of cost. 10
The major appeal of this approach is quite obvious: in contrast
with the standard optimal income tax theory, the details of the actual
tax law and tax enforcement are very much in the picture."' If we
can determine what should be a deductible business expense or a tax-
free fringe benefit using Kaplow's method, we can evaluate any other
tax rule as well. The same is true of the structure and magnitude of
sanctions.
104 Se id.
10 See id. at 140 (evaluating the equity effect by comparing SWF values); id. at 143
(evaluating the efficiency effect by undertaking the "usual" deadweight loss analysis).
106 See id. at 140.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 144-47. It is unclear, however, how an analyst would identify which spe-
cific rules should be potential targets of reforms. Kaplow refers to such rules as those
arising from incidental discrimination resulting from administrative complexity, costly en-
forcement, and so on. Id. at 135. Presumably, one needs to specify an ideal/optimal tax
system before being in a position to identify which rules deviate from it. The optimal tax
system Kaplow has in mind is the optimal income tax. Problems with using that system as
the basis of evaluating actual tax rules and sanctions have been already discussed.
109 Id. at 137-38.
110 If all inequity is fully replaced by inefficiency, the analysis is reduced to the stan-
dard deadweight loss calculations for any particular regime.
III See Kaplow, supra note 86, at 138 (giving examples of distinguishing between busi-
ness and personal expenses, evaluating fringe benefits, and taxing imputed income from
housing); id. at 144 (referring to higher audit rates, more intensive audits, greater informa-
tion reporting, and a range of penalties).
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Yet Kaplow's approach is unlikely to help in evaluating the effi-
ciency of actual tax provisions, let alone in reforming them with the
aim of achieving the welfare-maximizing regime. The main problems
are its level of generality, its information demands, and its
indeterminacy.
Kaplow's approach, no doubt, is entirely consistent with welfare
economics. In fact, economic analysis of any area of the law may be
performed in the same way. Should a particular regulatory regime be
strict liability or threshold-based? Should sanctions depend on acts or
harms? Should there be something like the RCRA for managing haz-
ardous waste and, if so, should it have the physical barrier require-
ment described above? To answer each question, we can plug the
alternative specifications into the preferred SWF and choose the re-
gime with the higher value. The entire law and economics enterprise
may be supplanted by this approach.
The reason this has not happened is obvious: articulating more
specific prescriptions has a very strong appeal. Legislators, judges,
and administrators may understand the concept of externalities and
transaction costs and even have intuitions about their likely magni-
tude in a particular setting. These policymakers may be fairly confi-
dent that in some situations an act-based regime is preferable to a
harm-based regime because, for instance, many offenders will be judg-
ment proof if the latter system is chosen.' 1 2 Regulators may even have
a reasonably good grasp of the tradeoffs involved in the basic cost-
benefit analysis. But no decisionmaker would be moved by an appeal
to resolve legal and policy questions by comparing the values of social
welfare functions.113
Kaplow himself realizes this well. While he retains his commit-
ment to welfare economics in analyzing a variety of antitrust rules, he
successfully develops much more certain and fine-grained prescrip-
112 Sanctions in act-based regimes are generally lower than in harm-based ones be-
cause act-based sanctions reflect expected harms (or losses) rather than the actual ones.
113 The use of an SWF-based approach to design optimal enforcement strategies en-
tails further complications. The main problem is that such an approach would rely heavily
on assumptions about the optimal legal regime. Unfortunately, there appears to be no
grounding for some of the important assumptions that would need to be made. For in-
stance, it is unclear how the SWF-based optimization would incorporate uncertainty. Per-
haps we can assume that the SWF is optimized if all taxpayers "fully" comply with the law.
Or we can assume that it is optimized if taxpayers take positions that have a fifty-fifty
chance of being upheld. In the former case, a somewhat uncertain position (seventy- to
eighty-percent likelihood of success in litigation) is not welfare-maximizing; in the latter
case, it is. It is also unclear why we should assume that the SWF is maximized with full
compliance, given that full compliance never justifies its costs. If, however, we posit that
the optimized SWF incorporates some noncompliance, it will be unclear how to determine
whether any individual act of noncompliance is consistent with the optimized SWF. If it is,
the act is welfare-maximizing and should not be penalized; otherwise, it should.
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tions based on intuitive balancing of specific costs and benefits.1 14
Even though that simpler balancing still imposes significant informa-
tion demands on decisionmakers, there is little doubt that it is much
more plausible as a guide for antitrust policy than the suggestion to
compare social welfare functions reflecting various versions of a rule.
Kaplow's insistence on such comparisons in evaluating tax rules and
sanctions suggests that he sees no way of simplifying the tax inquiry
along the lines of his antitrust analysis.
A more recent, extensive, and far-reaching line of Kaplow's work
may be viewed as another effort to connect tax law theory and prac-
tice. This view would be mistaken, however, as Kaplow himself recog-
nizes. The work in question is based on the concept of a distribution-
neutral income tax adjustment that allows an analyst to separate,
under certain assumptions, efficiency and distributive consequences
of any policy, including many possible tax reforms.'15 This separation
produces many benefits. It brings much-needed conceptual clarity to
all sorts of reform proposals. It reveals that some well-known funda-
mental insights apply more broadly than was generally believed. It
also allows nontax scholars to focus on the areas of their expertise by
setting aside questions of redistribution that are left to be addressed
by the optimal tax theory. But the distribution-neutral income tax ad-
justment method is based on a tax system that does not exist, and it
relies on an adjustment that cannot be made in practice. 16 Further-
more, the distribution-neutral income tax adjustment approach does
not free policymakers from the need to deploy SWF analysis in order
to evaluate the distributive effects of various policies. For all these
reasons, as Kaplow notes, "the distribution-neutral construct is prima-
rily an analytical device, not a specific policy prescription to be fol-
lowed precisely or otherwise." 17
Weisbach uses a different strategy. In a brief and little-known es-
say, he identifies the main problem with the standard approach to
evaluating tax rules and sanctions and suggests an intriguing alterna-
tive. 118 "Assuming that there are set categories of evasion and avoid-
114 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
115 See KAPLOW, supra note 81, at 25-31.
116 Even economists (who generally tend to be less constrained by implementation
difficulties than lawyers are) have expressed this view. See, e.g., BEv DAHLBY, THE MARGINAL
COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 46 (2008) ("[I]t is highly unlikely that
the required tax adjustments reflecting individuals' marginal benefits are ever applied in
practice."); Agnar Sandmo, Redistribution and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds, 70 J. PUB.
ECON. 365, 375 (1998) (concluding that the distribution-neutral adjustment of nonlinear
income tax "seems hardly realistic").
117 Louis Kaplow, An Optimal Tax System 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17214, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7214.
118 See David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 96TH AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION, NATIONAL TAx ASSOCIATION 9, 9 (David Merriman ed.,
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ance, as is done in most of the literature [that is, assuming that some
transactions, events, etc. should be taxable while others should not],"
Weisbach writes, "assumes the central problem... . Instead, we must
determine which responses to taxation will be treated in various fash-
ions based directly on the welfare consequences of such treatment."' 19
To make this determination, Weisbach proposes to use either of
the two related tools for evaluating such consequences: the marginal
efficiency cost of funds (MECF) analysis and the taxable income elas-
ticity approach. 20 Focusing on the former, Weisbach reminds the
readers that the MECF of various changes in legal rules and sanctions
depends on four variables: the marginal burden imposed by the
change on taxpayers, the marginal change in the costs of compliance,
the marginal revenue raised by the change, and its marginal adminis-
trative costs.' 2 ' In its simplest form, MECF is the sum of the first two
of these values divided by the difference between the second two. The
standard MECF analysis concludes by suggesting that in evaluating any
marginal tax or tax enforcement reform, we should pursue changes in
policy instruments with the lowest MECF because it would allow us to
raise revenue at the lowest social cost.12 2
Weisbach goes further. His key insight is that in deciding which
taxpayer acts should be legal and which should not, that is, what is the
optimal content of the tax law (or at least its numerous anti-avoidance
rules),
[d]isallowed evasion is simply the class of responses to taxation that
it is efficient to prevent. Tax rules preventing these activities have a
low MECF. Allowable avoidance activity is the class of responses to
taxation that are efficient to allow. Tax rules that would disallow
these activities would have a high MECF.... Disallowed evasion is
likely to include those activities that are relatively cheap to prevent
or that would lose a lot of revenue if allowed. For example, failing
to file a return or filing false returns, if allowed, would lose substan-
tial revenue and, therefore, must be treated as disallowed evasion.
Working less, while potentially creating a large revenue loss, would
be difficult or impossible to prevent, and, therefore, falls into the
class of allowed avoidance.12 3
2004). As of January 30, 2013, the essay has been cited three times in the Westlaw Law
Reviews database, and once by a paper posted on SSRN. The SSRN citation is one of only
two English-language (and three total) citations in Google Scholar.
119 Id. at 9.
120 Id. at 10.
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal
Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 172, 188-89 (1996).
123 Weisbach, supra note 118, at 12. While Weisbach claims that "[i]t is easy to imagine
how the avoidance/evasion type regime we have arises from this analysis," id., this view
appears to be too optimistic. To take Weisbach's own example, some return Filing viola-
tions are indeed cheap to prevent. Others, such as violations by the so-called "informal
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This strategy appears promising because it is focused on the right
questions and seems more plausible than Kaplow's approach. Surely a
marginal burden of a change in the economic substance doctrine or
an amendment to corporate reorganization rules will not be known
precisely, and neither will the marginal change in revenue resulting
from such revisions. But we make related estimates all the time in
evaluating revenue effects of new legislation.' 24 So it is conceivable
that the MECF of various marginal changes could be estimated with
reasonable precision.125
Unfortunately, Weisbach's suggestion cannot resolve the funda-
mental disconnect between the actual tax regime and the design of
optimal tax rules and sanctions. The main problem is that MECF is
the analysis of marginal changes.' 26 It is of little help in reaching the
social optimum-the ambition of the general law and economics anal-
ysis. In fact, economists Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki, on whose
MECF analysis Weisbach relies, are careful to emphasize this point:
Although marginal analysis can be helpful for evaluating small
changes in the tax system, it cannot handle the grand design of the
tax system. Because of the nature of the system-namely, the non-
continuity of administrative costs, nonconcavity of the revenue con-
straint, nonconcavity of deadweight loss, and increasing returns to
scale in tax administration-changes to it cannot be evaluated by
deriving marginal conditions in a well-behaved optimization prob-
lem. In order to compare the actual level of the social welfare func-
tion under different tax regimes, one may have to resort to
simulation models.127
Comparing the levels of the social welfare function in various regimes
is, of course, precisely what Kaplow instructs us to do.128
In sum, Kaplow reasons from the general to the specific. He
demonstrates how comparing SWF values may allow us to choose
among any particular set of tax rules or penalties. The method is too
abstract and indeterminate to be of practical use. Weisbach starts with
suppliers," are notoriously difficult to detect. The actual solution to this problem is to
tolerate a considerable amount of evasion by these taxpayers. SeeJoel Slemrod, Small Busi-
ness and the Tax System, in THE CRISIS IN TAx ADMINISTRATION 83-84, 86 n.39 (Henry J.
Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004). If our rules followed Weisbach's approach, we would
make nonpayment of taxes by informal suppliers legal.
124 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq
Case, 88 TAx NOTES 221, 238 (2000).
125 The precision of the revenue estimates is debatable. But so is policymakers' ability
to decide whether a negligence or strict liability regime is more appropriate in a particular
area on efficiency grounds or to make necessary determinations in other areas subject to
the general law and economics analysis.
126 SeeJonathan Shaw et al., Administration and Compliance, in DIMENSIONS OF TAx DE-
SIGN: THE MIRRLEEs REVIEw 1100, 1108 n.4 (Sir James Mirrlees et al. eds., 2010).
127 Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 122, at 192.
128 See Kaplow, supra note 86, at 137-40,
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the specific and generalizes. He attempts to use marginal analysis to
arrive at the optimal system. This move cannot be made without mak-
ing assumptions that are, as Slemrod and Yitzhaki point out, unjusti-
fied. These are the only efforts to develop an approach to assessing
the actual tax rules and sanctions by reference to the optimal tax
regime.
Kaplow's and Weisbach's important but ultimately unsuccessful
efforts to overcome the baseline problem reveal the limits of the eco-
nomic analysis of taxation. The core ideas of general law and eco-
nomics are simple and easy to grasp. Economic analysis of law has
been remarkably successful not only in using these ideas to devise so-
cially optimal systems but in reforming the actual legal regimes as
well. These successes include important Supreme Court cases,129 Sig-
nificant statutory developments,13 0 and fundamental shifts in entire
legal regimes.131
In contrast, the reasoning used by Kaplow and Weisbach is tech-
nical and complex. There is nothing intuitive about the social welfare
function and the marginal efficiency cost of funds. Despite complex-
ity, these concepts are hardly helpful to decisionmakers interested in
improving the actual tax system. No wonder the debate between eco-
nomically oriented legal scholars on the one hand, and policy-focused
tax practitioners (as well as, I suspect, the vast majority of legal aca-
demics) on the other, evokes the metaphor of ships passing in the
night.
3. Like Ships Passing in the Night
Faithful to the core ideas of public economics, Weisbach sees all
tax-motivated actions as socially undesirable. He sees the relevant
boundary not between legal and illegal acts but between tax-motivated
and nontax-motivated decisions. Not surprisingly, he explains to the
less economically oriented analysts pondering how to separate accept-
129 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82
(2007) (overruling the per se rule against vertical price restraints under the Sherman Act
on the ground that "respected economic analysts . .. conclude that vertical price restraints
can have procompetitive effects"); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988) (up-
holding lower courts' application of a "rebuttable presumption of reliance, supported in
part by the fraud-on-the-market theory" to public statements made by the corporate
defendant).
130 See Ian Ayres, Valuing Modem Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 886 (2003).
131 See Patrick Van Cayseele & Roger Van den Bergh, Antitrust Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND EcONoMics 467, 467 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1999)
(concluding that "[i]n the USA economic views on competition theory have had a much
clearer impact on antitrust law: legal rules tend to change when the underlying economic
theory changes"); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEo. L.J. 439, 441-42 n.5 (2001) (arguing that corporate law worldwide is converg-
ing toward the set of rules aimed at maximizing long-term shareholder value and, there-
fore, social welfare, as advocated by most law and economics scholars).
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able tax planning from illegal tax shelters that their approach misses
the point:
[T]ax planning, all tax planning, not just planning associated with
traditional notions of shelters, produces nothing of value. Nothing
is gained by finding new ways to turn ordinary income into capital
gain, to push a gain offshore, or to generate losses.... Tax plan-
ning is actually far worse than that. It is almost always positively bad
for society-it is worse than worthless. 32
Weisbach is surely right. Every instance of tax planning is a socially
costly irredeemable act.
Michael Schler (and, I am sure, many others) is perplexed by
Weisbach's argument.
Surely there is nothing wrong in a democracy for Congress to deter-
mine that there is less tax due if a transaction is done one way
rather than another way, even if the result may be economic ineffi-
ciency. ... Using Weisbach's terminology, if Congress enacts a tax
credit for backflips [a metaphor for purely wasteful activity], Con-
gress has determined that backflips are socially desirable. If a tax-
payer learns to do backflips and earns the credit, it is doing nothing
wrong. On the contrary, in the view of Congress, the taxpayer adds
to the overall social welfare.133
Congress decides what is good and bad for society, Schler asserts.
If Weisbach wants to call congressional choices efficient, or welfare
improving (or groovy for that matter), he can certainly do so. But
whatever rule Congress enacts, acting consistently with congressional
intent is desirable even if the only reason for doing so is tax minimiza-
tion. If so, the only thing left to consider on a case-by-case basis is
whether actions of a particular taxpayer are consistent with congres-
sional intent. Needless to say, economic analysis has little to contrib-
ute to this inquiry.
Kyle Logue goes even further than Schler. Logue studies the ef-
fects of legal uncertainty on the design of optimal tax penalties. 34
Before starting this analysis, he states:
[I]t is assumed throughout this article that the federal tax laws, as
ultimately interpreted by a court, represent the will of Congress and
are therefore presumptively social-welfare-maximizing. . . . [TJo
render the deterrence analysis tractable, these assumptions-that
Congressional intent is welfare maximizing and that courts are al-
ways right-are necessary.135
132 Weisbach, supra note 90, at 222.
133 Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions,
and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAx L. REv. 325, 385 (2002).
134 See Logue, supra note 8, at 242.
135 Id. at 258-59.
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The assumptions Logue views as necessary for the economic anal-
ysis of tax enforcement reverse the usual relation between economics
and the law. The logical sequence is to examine behavior, evaluate its
costs and benefits, and then design legal rules and sanctions to mini-
mize net social costs. This is precisely how law and economics scholars
have approached the question. With this approach, actions are illegal
because they are socially harmful.136 In contrast, under Logue's as-
sumptions, actions are socially harmful because they are illegal.'a 7
The problem with this reversal is that if one defines social harm as the
violation of legal rules, it is impossible to design legal rules with the
goal of minimizing the social harm produced by their violations. 38
Logue, Schler, and Weisbach are among the most thoughtful and
knowledgeable tax analysts of the day. Their complete failure to en-
gage each others' arguments is staggering. 39 And its cause is quite
apparent-the baseline problem. Weisbach's implicit baseline is not
even the optimal income tax but the lump-sum tax. He views all tax-
motivated decisions as wasteful. Schler does not see the implicit lump-
sum tax baseline as having any relevance to the discussion. This base-
line is so far removed from the realities of our tax system that it is
wholly unhelpful to make arguments by reference to it. If an econo-
mist views a tax-motivated sale of a depreciated security and a tax-mo-
tivated lease-in, lease-out transaction that generates tax savings from
mere paper shuffling as potentially equally problematic, the econo-
mist has nothing useful to say to people concerned with improving
the actual tax rules. Logue resolves the baseline problem by assuming
it away.
This state of affairs is uninspiring but not unexpected. The
chasm between economic theory of optimal taxation and the legal
analysis of the actual tax system is vast.140 The unquestionable success
of public economics in addressing the undeterrability and redistribu-
tion problems is not sufficient to supply a realistic approach to opti-
136 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Infor-
mation About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 93, 96 (1990).
137 Logue, supra note 8, at 257-61.
138 Logue acknowledges that Congress can mismanage the tax system, but he defends
his assumption as necessary and explains that "if one is especially troubled by the quality of
Congress's tax lawmaking record or by the courts' performance in tax cases, those issues
should be addressed directly." Id. at 259. Addressing the quality of lawmaking is, of
course, the core of the normative strand of law and economics.
139 Schler's article is a direct response to Weisbach's. See Schler, supra note 133, at 327.
Logue does not explicitly address Weisbach's arguments. However, his conclusion that the
only way to conduct economic analysis of tax sanctions is to assume away the problem of
designing optimal tax rules means that he views the fundamental law and economics enter-
prise of optimizing outcomes by simultaneously designing rules and sanctions-an enter-
prise Weisbach is very much engaged in-as impossible in the tax setting.
140 Economists interested in the connection between theory and actual laws and insti-
tutions fully appreciate the magnitude of the gap. See infra note 183.
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mizing the existing tax rules and sanctions. The optimal income tax
baseline is not a solution. In fact, the limitations of the optimal tax
theory are at the core of the limits of tax law and economics. These
limitations exist for a reason, and they will not disappear any time
soon, as the next section explains.
4. Choices, Judgments, Infonation-The Unique Challenges of Tax
Law and Economics
In order to understand the remarkable power of the economic
analysis of law, one needs to go no further than the first paragraph of
this Article's introduction to law and economics.1 4' That paragraph
grounds much of the later discussion in two basic assumptions. First,
society consists of rational individuals maximizing their utility. Sec-
ond, the social objective is to maximize overall wellbeing. While the
very same paragraph states that both assumptions are controversial,
they are fairly easy to understand and accept, at least as working hy-
potheses. More importantly, these assumptions are much easier to
understand and accept than the choices, judgments, and empirical
conclusions discussed below.
The key point underlying the success of law and economics is
this: almost all of the most powerful, intuitive, and therefore influen-
tial insights generated by the economic analysis of law can be derived
based on just the two basic assumptions combined with a few self-evi-
dent observations.
In contracting settings (that is, where face-to-face negotiation is
possible), it is hardly controversial that the bargaining parties will
often have asymmetric information. 42 It is equally self-evident that
many agreements extend over time and involve sequential invest-
ments by the contracting parties. Bingo! These observations plus the
two basic assumptions are all a legal economist needs to identify the
holdup problem, the moral hazard problem, the adverse selection
problem, the agency problem, and the more general problem of in-
centive incompatibility.14 3 These core insights go a long way toward
explaining (in the positive version) or reforming (in the normative
version) contract law, commercial law, insurance law, parts of securi-
ties regulation, and so on. In fact, three versions of the agency prob-
lem allow a legal economist to explain or revise the content of almost
the entire corporate law.144
141 See supra Part I.A.1.
142 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 14, at 833.
143 See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the
Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. REv. 1377, 1386 n.75, 1398 (2008).
144 These three agency problems exist between (i) shareholders and managers, (ii)
debt-holders and equity-holders, and (iii) majority owners and minority owners of corpora-
tions. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Internal Poison Pills, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1169, 1171 (2009).
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In settings where contracting is impossible due to high transac-
tion costs, the phenomenon of negative (and positive) externalities
follows directly from the rational individual assumption. That phe-
nomenon, in turn, explains the tragedy of the commons and anticom-
mons, 1 4 5 the undersupply of public goods and the difficulty of their
pricing,14 6 the existence of property rights, 147 and the content of
many areas of government regulation ranging from environmental
law14 8 to occupational safety to food safety.14 9
All of this does not mean that the entire law and economics en-
terprise is a child's play with a few basic concepts. It does not mean
that identifying the fundamental problems and tensions just described
leads to self-evident solutions. It does not mean that we have all the
information needed to translate our understanding of these problems
and tensions into specific policy prescriptions or that such informa-
tion may be easily obtained in the future. It does not mean that law
and economics is not full of vigorous theoretical debates. Nor does it
mean that economic theory has stopped evolving such that no new
insights need to be incorporated into policy prescriptions developed
by law and economics scholars. But it does mean that a few fairly
modest assumptions provide economic analysis of law with an enor-
mous analytical power, power that for the past several decades has
been unmatched by any other conceptual approach to legal analysis.
Before a reader rushes to object to my repeated characterization
of the fundamental premises of law and economics as "fairly modest"
and "fairly easy to understand and accept," let us consider what kinds
of assumptions are needed to get the economic analysis of taxation off
the ground.
To begin with, the analyst must assume rational, utility-maximiz-
ing actors and the social goal of welfare maximization.150 The analyst
must also assume perfect capital markets' 5 ' and perfectly competitive
145 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 1-2 (2008) (explaining the tragedy
of the anticommons); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1244-45 (1968) (articulating the tragedy of the commons).
146 See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REv. 795, 801, 838 (1987).
147 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347,
347-49 (1967).
148 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. Rav. 570,
593-97 (1996).
149 See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025,
1098-99 (1983) (critically discussing externality-based justifications for regulating food ad-
ditives, occupational health, and aircraft safety).
150 See, e.g., Logue & Slemrod, supra note 7, at 806.
151 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New Nero Wel-
fare Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMIcs 1034, 1034 (Alan J. Auerbach & Mar-
tin Feldstein eds., 1987). Perfect capital markets mean that "all investors obtain the same
return." Id.
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economy.' 52 Once the uniform lump-sum tax is ruled out on distribu-
tional grounds, the analyst must tackle the redistribution problem.
At this point, one needs to decide what should be the basis of
redistribution. There is no obvious answer to this question, and there
is nothing in economic theory that gives economists a particular ad-
vantage in formulating possible answers and choosing among them.
Maybe we should redistribute based on ability, maybe based on bene-
fits, sacrifice, opportunities, luck, sunny disposition, good looks, or
something else. This seems like a question for moral philosophers.
Yet a book entitled Tax Philosophers: Two Hundred Years of Thought in
Great Britain and the United States describes the views of Smith, Mill,
Seligman, Edgeworth, Pigou, Fisher, Vickrey, Kaldor, and Keynes,
among others' 53-all prominent economists of their day.154 This is
no accident. Economists must choose the basis of redistribution be-
cause without this choice, the analysis stops in its tracks. Yet for
whatever reason, Kant and Hegel, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, Rawls,
Raz, and Dworkin have not been particularly interested in addressing
the question.155 So economists did the best they could, settled on abil-
ity to pay as the answer, and proceeded with the analysis.
That choice alone, it seems, is not just more contestable than the
rational behavior assumption; it reflects a different order to contest-
ability. It involves value judgments about what constitutes a just soci-
ety, what citizens owe to each other, and what limitations on liberty
are acceptable, to name a few. Granted, some of these questions are
also raised when one assumes that the society's goal is welfare max-
imization. But that assumption must also be made to proceed with
152 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 81, at 26.
153 See generally HAROLD M. GROVES, TAx PHILOSOPHERS: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF
THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (Donald J. Curran ed., 1974).
154 To be sure, Adam Smith authored The Theory of Moral Sentiment and held the Chair
in Moral Philosophy. Economics and moral philosophy have "affinity by birth." Jagdish
Bhagwati, Markets and Morality, 101 Am. ECON. REV.: PAPER & PROC. 162, 162 (2011). But
economics became an independent discipline by the mid-nineteenth century, see id., well
before many of the scholars mentioned in the text published their contributions.
155 The discussion of the ability to pay principle by two moral philosophers who re-
cently focused on taxes and justice is dominated by reciting the views of economists such as
Mill, Pigou, Walker, and so on as well. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF
OWNERSHIP 20-30 (2002). This is quite understandable. While Rawls and Dworkin cer-
tainly have a lot to say about inequality, their discussions have only a highly attenuated
connection to tax policy. See Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model,
64 TAx L. REV. 229, 273 (2011) ("Applying Dworkin's theory to taxation raises some ques-
tions about the implications of the theory."); Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive justice and
Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1991,
1994 (2004) ("Rawls wrote a great deal about economic justice generally, but very little
about taxation in particular, and what he did say is puzzling."). For a discussion of various
inconsistent interpretations of Kant's brief and general views on taxation and inequality,
see Gary Banham, Kant and the Ethics of Taxation, 13 J. Accr. ETHICS & PUB. POt'Y 301,
347-69 (2012).
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economic analysis of taxation. In any case, choosing the ability to pay
as the basis for redistribution is just the beginning.
Making this choice does not get the economic analysis of taxation
very far. Ability is an abstract and unquantifiable concept.' 56 Econo-
mists need a more practicable proxy to work with. What should it be?
There are more plausible answers than one might expect. The candi-
dates include wages, wealth, returns to savings, consumption in gen-
eral, consumption of certain items, height, LSAT scores, and so on.
An economist might say that if each of these characteristics is a plausi-
ble (and, importantly, unique in a sense of not being a replication of
any other characteristic) reflection of ability, then all of them should
be used as proxies.157 That is a nice move, but as a practical matter
using more than one of these characteristics makes the analysis ex-
tremely difficult, and using more than a few makes it completely in-
tractable. 58 It is no accident that the canonical optimal income tax
theory uses a single proxy for ability: the wage rate. Even in that case,
the theory has to rely on simulations because no useful general solu-
tions are available. 59
Selecting the proxy for ability to pay is neither trivial as an empiri-
cal matter nor judgment-free. Just imagine the political fallout if a
presidential candidate proposes to vary the tax burden based on one's
height (as two economists recently considered).o6 0 But settling on the
wage rate as the basis for redistribution only brings an economist to
an even more challenging question: how much redistribution is ap-
propriate? Needless to say, economics is not the discipline that can
answer this question.
To economists' credit, they found a way to address this complica-
tion. The social welfare function may take any number of forms from
156 See Slemrod, supra note 79, at 163 (explaining that tax on ability is ruled out by the
optimal income tax theory because "ability is impossible for the government to observe");
id. at 168 (referring to ability as "unobservable and practically unmeasurable").
157 For the seminal paper making this argument, see George A. Akerlof, The Economics
of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68
Am. EcON. REV. 8, 8 (1978).
158 See, e.g., Wojciech Kopczuk, Redistribution When Avoidance Behavior Is Heterogeneous,
81 J. Pus. ECON. 51, 57 (2001) (explaining that the "general model of linear taxation in
[the foundational work of Peter Diamond and James Mirrlees] does not assume identical
utility functions and thus allows for types of heterogeneity other than just skill differences.
However, generality of that approach makes it difficult to isolate consequences of distribu-
tional characteristics.").
159 See, e.g.,John Creedy, Personal Income Taxation: From Theory to Policy, 42 AuSTL. ECON.
REv. 496, 501 (2009) ("[E]ven with simple forms for the social welfare function, the utility
functions and the wage rate distribution, explicit solutions (to the tax optimization prob-
lem] are not available. Numerical simulation results ... are therefore ubiquitous in the
optimal tax literature.").
160 See N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case
Study of Utilitarian Income Redistributions, 2 Am. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'v 155, 156 (2010).
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utilitarian (everyone's utility counts equally) to maximin (maximizing
the utility of the worst-off (minimal utility) individual).161 It turns out
that the optimal tax theory yields largely the same answers in either
case: the optimal system includes a demogrant and constant or declin-
ing marginal rates.' 62 As one would expect, the demogrant and the
rates are higher for the maximin SWF than for the utilitarian one,163
but these are secondary questions. The optimal tax is still a tax on
labor income, and the rate schedule still has the same structure. 164
This is a powerful result because it incorporates widely diverging
views of justice and equality. But this result falters on the empirical
side. Picking a social welfare function and choosing the wage rate as
the basis for redistribution, it turns out, is not enough to generate
firm conclusions. One also needs to assume a shape of the distribu-
tion of abilities (wage rates) in the society. This is an empirical guess.
The traditional assumption has been that this distribution is
lognormal.165 But when Emanuel Saez asserted that the existing data
suggest that high-ability individuals are better described by the Pareto
distribution, one of the main theoretical results-declining marginal
rates-flipped. 6 6 Saez, now joined by Peter Diamond, continues to
argue that the Pareto distribution is a more plausible reflection of re-
ality.167 Other leading economists defend the lognormal distribution
assumption.166 Forty years afterJames Mirrlees founded the optimal
income tax theory, it remains unclear whether the marginal rates
should increase or decline with income, even if we accept the theory's
many contestable assumptions.
Moreover, incorporating a wide variety of distributional prefer-
ences in the social welfare function does not mean that the standard
optimal tax theory takes full account of possible distributional prefer-
ences or reflects all views of fairness and justice. As to the former,
distributional preferences more egalitarian than maximin and more
libertarian than utilitarianism are generally ignored.169 As to the lat-
ter, normative judgments about the appropriate basis for redistribu-
161 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 88, at 1915-16; Kaplow, supra note 86, at 137.
162 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 88, at 1945.
163 See id. at 1955.
164 See id. at 1954.
165 See, e.g., MATTi TUOmALA, OrIAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION 95 (1990); see
also Mankiw et al., supra note 72, at 157 (stating that a lognormal distribution has tradition-
ally been used to describe the distribution of abilities in society).
166 See Emmanuel Saez, Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates, 68 REv.
ECON. STUD. 205, 226 (2001). Pareto distribution is "thicker" at high ability values (i.e., it
has relatively more taxpayers with very high ability). See Mankiw et al., supra note 72, at
152. Estimating the distribution of ability is "a task fraught with perils." Id.
167 Diamond & Saez, supra note 80, at 168-71.
168 See Mankiw et al., supra note 72, at 152.
169 See KAPLOw, supra note 81, at 44-45.
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tion and the reasonable (and acceptable) proxies for ability obviously
precede the decision about the shape of the social welfare function.
This line of argument may be easily extended further. There is
continuing uncertainty regarding the optimal taxation of capital in-
come. The prevailing view still appears to be that capital income
should not be taxed at all,170 but there are recent arguments in favor
of its progressive as well as regressive taxation.171 The choice, again,
depends on the assumptions that are far from uncontroversial and
very far from being generally accepted in the field.
Difficult questionsjust keep on coming. A theory of optimal taxa-
tion is woefully incomplete without addressing the treatment of cross-
border transactions. Economists tackling these questions realized
long ago that policy prescriptions differ dramatically depending on
whether the optimization problem is focused on national or global
welfare.' 7 2 This is yet another challenge that nontax law and econom-
ics scholars simply do not face. Those writing about tort law, corpo-
rate law, contract law, competition law, securities regulation, and so
on do not seem to worry about global welfare too much. One nontax
area where it is impossible to ignore cross-border flows of capital,
goods, and services is trade regulation. Fortunately for law and eco-
nomics scholars studying international trade, the economists' answer
is that maximization of national and global welfare lead to the same
policy prescription-free trade. 73 The same is certainly not true in
tax. Yet the choice of national versus global welfare determines the
analysis of an entire set of rules for taxation of inbound and outbound
transactions. Needless to say, that choice is neither self-evident nor
uncontested.
170 See, e.g., Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles
and a Possible Explanation, 93J. PuB. EcoN. 855, 855 (2009); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel
Saez, A Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation I (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor) ("According to the profession's most popular theoretical models, optimal tax rates
on capital should be equal to zero in the long run . . . .").
171 See, e.g., KAPLOW, supra note 81, at 228-29 (describing a rationale for a regressive
capital income tax developed in the new dynamic public finance literature); Diamond &
Saez, supra note 80, at 177 (concluding that "capital income should be taxed"); Slemrod,
supra note 79, at 161 (explaining that under various empirical assumptions, capital income
should either be taxed, not taxed, or subsidized); Stiglitz, supra note 151, at 1031-33 (ex-
plaining why under certain assumptions, capital income should either be taxed or subsi-
dized if either of the two famous partial equilibrium models establishing the standard zero
tax on capital income result-one of the models being coauthored by Stiglitz himself-is
extended in a general equilibrium setting).
172 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAx L. REv. 261, 277, 280, 284 (2001) (arguing that
international income tax policies should be guided by concern for national welfare).
173 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Whzat Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. EcoN.
LIT. 113, 113, 115 (1997). The so-called "optimal tariff" argument is an exception that
appears to be increasingly irrelevant in the globalized economy not dominated by any par-
ticular country. See id. at 113 n.1.
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These are the challenges of public finance and its legal cousin,
tax law and economics. These challenges make the tax optimization
problem uniquely complex. They underlie the emerging critiques of
the canonical optimal tax theory. No doubt, these challenges are
among the core reasons (if not the core reason) for the particularly
wide gap between that theory and the real-life tax system.' 74 The next
Part addresses the far-reaching implications of these conclusions.
II
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITS OF TAx
LAW AND ECONOMICS
In order to fully appreciate the policy implications of the chal-
lenges and limitations discussed in the previous Part, one needs to
recall the standard normative approach of law and economics. The
analyst begins with designing a socially optimal legal regime. He then
makes one of two arguments in favor of bringing actual legal rules and
sanctions closer to the optimum. First, he may argue that if policy-
makers care about maximizing efficiency, then they should adopt this
or that reform.175 Given the well-known problem of second best, this
argument must account for the difference between the actual legal
174 One may argue that another factor distinguishing taxation from other areas of eco-
nomic regulation is the political salience of tax policy. This argument may indeed explain
many features of the Internal Revenue Code, such as double taxation of corporate income,
mortgage interest deduction, and numerous rifle-shot tax benefits, to take just some exam-
ples. But legal academics almost uniformly view these provisions as misguided. See, e.g.,
Adam Chodorow, Economic Analysis in judicial Decision Making-An Assessment Based on judge
Posner's Tax Decisions, 25 VA. TAx REv. 67, 103 n.5 (2005) (referring to numerous rifle-shot
and similar provisions as inconsistent with the goal of efficiency); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Un-
certain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REv. 613, 615-16
(1990) (acknowledging that "[c]ommentators frequently criticize the double taxation of
corporate income as contrary to the tax policy goals of equity and efficiency" and that
"[t] he implications of double taxation on equity and efficiency have led many to conclude
that distributed corporate income should be relieved from the burden of the corporate
tax," while questioning these conclusions); DennisJ. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A
History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 233,
278, 282 (2010) (stating that "[t]he economic case against the [mortgage interest deduc-
tion] . . . is indisputable" and arguing that '[a]ssuming that national policymakers and the
American public still consider homeownership a worthy goal, repealing the [mortgage in-
terest deduction] would remove an obstacle to achieving that objective"). While a repeal
of all these provisions is extremely unlikely for political economy considerations, econo-
mists and tax law and economics scholars are all but united in viewing these provisions as
bad tax policy. In contrast, tax law and economics scholars almost uniformly reject the
optimal tax theory as a practical policy guide-a view that cannot be explained by political
salience of taxation and similar considerations.
175 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the De-
mands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 911 (2003); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics
of Moral and Legal Theory, 11] HARv. L. REv. 1637, 1669-70 (1998) ("What the economist
can say, which is a lot but not everything, is that if a society values prosperity (or freedom
or equality), these are the various policies that will conduce to that goal, and these are the
costs associated with each.").
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regime under consideration and the socially optimal one.176 Alterna-
tively, the analyst may explicitly ground the normative argument in
the positive claim. Corporate law (commercial law, securities regula-
tion, etc.), he might say, is generally efficient. Whether or not the
decisionmaker cares about efficiency, it appears that "the system"
does. Changing a particular rule in this or that direction is a good
idea because it will bring the legal regime even closer to the welfare-
maximizing one. The common feature of both arguments is obvious:
the closer the actual legal regime is to the optimal one, the more per-
suasive these arguments are.
Law and economics scholars in tort law, antitrust law, corporate
law, and securities law have claimed that each of these regimes is fairly
close to the welfare-maximizing one.'77 Whether or not one agrees
with these claims, they have some (and in some cases considerable)
plausibility. The same is demonstrably not true of tax. Therefore,
each of the normative law and economics arguments just described is
significantly weaker in tax than elsewhere. This weakness has a
profound effect on the debates about the fundamental features of our
tax system. It shapes the meaning of the foundational tax concepts. It
affects the familiar arguments about anti-avoidance rules and sanc-
tions. It even extends to evaluating outright tax evasion. In sum,
every aspect of the tax system is affected by this weakness. And so is
the economic analysis of many other areas of the law.
A. The Implications for the Fundamental Tax Policy Choices
The earlier discussion used a rule dealing with interest expense
allocation to highlight the difficulty of evaluating specific tax provi-
sions from the optimal tax perspective. 7s While this difficulty is in-
deed profound, the problem is much more serious than being unable
to connect an obscure rule affecting relatively few taxpayers to the
solid foundations of economic analysis. Rather, the problem is that
many fundamental features of our tax system cannot be analyzed on
the basis of the optimal tax theory, at least in its canonical form.
176 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 14, at 853 ("When economics was . . . able to say that
contract law was essentially efficient but for some tweaking here and there, it had the
potential to influence decisionmakers, for it worked with the past, not against it . . . "). If
the actual regime is nowhere close to the optimal one, any efficiency-based argument is at
best a marginal claim and should be evaluated alongside all other possible marginal im-
provements. See infra text accompanying notes 251-59.
177 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF
CORPORATE LA.w 102, 303 (1991); HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 60; WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 26 (1987); Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 131, at 441-42 n.5; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflec-
tions on the End of History for Corporate Law 7 (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 449,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2095419.
178 See supra Part I.C.2.
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Debates about these features have preoccupied academics, politi-
cians, and voters for decades, and these debates are as vigorous today
as they have ever been. How acceptable is the current situation when
nearly half of all taxpayers pay no income tax? Should the tax on
capital gains be lower or higher than it is today (and should it be
progressive like the tax on labor income or flat)? Should the corpo-
rate tax rate be lowered? Should dividends be subject to ordinary in-
come tax rates, reduced rates, or not taxed at all? Should the United
States continue with its effort to tax at least some income of its sub-
jects worldwide, or should it switch to a territorial system? What about
the estate tax that has remained on life support for the past decade?
Answering these questions involves major tax policy decisions. Yet
none of these decisions can be made based on the standard normative
approach of law and economics because the optimal tax theory is so
far removed from reality. The argument that "the system" reveals a
preference for welfare maximization is completely implausible in tax.
Even if a policymaker cares about efficiency, the second-best problems
are so severe that taking steps that would bring us closer to the opti-
mal regime may well be welfare reducing. Whatever may be used as a
guide for assessing reforms of actual tax rules and sanctions, the opti-
mal tax theory is not it.179
Economists occasionally point out that over the past several de-
cades, tax systems of many developed countries have changed in the
direction that is broadly consistent with the optimal tax theory pre-
scriptions. Top marginal rates have declined, the tax burden on capi-
tal income has decreased, and a value-added tax (a close relative of a
labor income tax) has become increasingly widespread.1 s0 Even as-
suming a causal relation between the optimal tax theory and these
17 As Martin Feldstein pointed out decades ago, "[elverything we know about the
theory of economic policy in other areas reminds us that optimal piecemeal policies can-
not be made by haphazard steps in the direction of the global optimum, that a constrained
second-best policy cannot be guided by the conclusions of an unconstrained optimization."
Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6J. PuB. ECON. 77, 77 (1976). While the law
and economics literature has mostly relied on Feldstein's analysis in studying legal transi-
tions, the article's spirit foreshadowed the MECF-type approach discussed in detail below.
See infra text accompanying notes 251-60.
180 See, e.g., Creedy, supra note 159, at 497-98 (referring to the "reduction in the num-
ber of marginal tax rates and the degree of rate progression"); Gordon & Li, supra note
170, at 855-56 (arguing that while "no taxes on capital income [and] uniform taxes on
consumption . . . are not consistent with any existing tax structures, they are not sharply
inconsistent with observed tax policies among the most developed countries"). Several
countries have recently adopted tax systems that appear relatively close to the optimal tax
regime. See Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, Conclusion, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM 149, 150 (AlanJ. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005). A detailed examination
of these systems-including the extent of their similarity to the optimal tax theory prescrip-
tions-awaits future research. See id.
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changes,181 this argument establishes a much weaker connection be-
tween theory and reality than the link that is assumed to exist in cor-
porate law, antitrust law, securities law, and so on. Quite clearly, this
connection sheds light on only a few of the fundamental questions
raised in the previous paragraph. And it fails to illuminate the myriad
of more specific tax rules altogether. Here, the contrast with the gen-
eral law and economics scholarship and with the earlier RCRA exam-
ple that used a few simple steps to connect the physical barrier
requirement to the ultimate goal of controlling externalities is partic-
ularly stark. 18 2
Another way of making the same point would be to take the opti-
mal tax theory as seriously as nontax law and economics scholars take
the ideals of a competitive economy or an efficient capital market.
This approach would readily lead to many clear answers. Given that
the optimal income tax has no tax on capital income, the corporate
tax, the dividend tax, and the capital gains tax should be abolished.
The estate tax should be repealed as well because it is certainly not a
part of the canonical optimal system. Instead of worrying about mil-
lions of taxpayers shielded from income tax by personal exemptions
and standard deductions, the government should write a uniform
check to every taxpayer in the country, Bill Gates and Warren Buffet
included. While we are at it, we should get rid of the increasing mar-
ginal rates because they are inconsistent with the classic optimal tax
theory. As for the worldwide versus territorial taxation, we should
probably stick to the worldwide regime (for labor income); or not-it
is hard to say given the lack of a theoretical foundation.
181 As economists understand well, "[e]stablishing a clear rationale for each policy ac-
tion is, of course, far from straightforward and the social welfare functions which play a
fundamental role in optimal tax theory seldom represent the varied objectives of politi-
cians." Creedy, supra note 159, at 498.
182 For instance, some influential judicial decisions expressly relied on economic rea-
soning for their main holdings. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947) (setting forth the famous Learned Hand formula for negligence);
United States v. Addystone Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), affd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899) (establishing the foundation of economically focused antitrust doc-
trine). Many cases reveal a remarkable familiarity of judges with the relevant law and eco-
nomics scholarship. Even a cursory review of major antitrust, corporate, and securities
cases reads as a "Who's Who" of the law and economics writings of the day. judges-and
Justices-apparently study not only major law reviews but the leading economic journals as
well. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890-93, 920
(2007) (referring to articles published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of
Political Economy, and RAND Journal of Economics, as well as the Review of Industrial
Organization, not to mention the Journal of Law and Economics). Scholars argue that
entire areas of the law (in all of their detail) are broadly consistent with efficiency max-
imization. See sources cited supra note 177. Even when Eric Posner asserted that economic
analysis of contract law has generally failed on both the positive and the normative dimen-
sions, he recognized that numerous contract law doctrines have efficiency-maximizing ef-
fect at least under some conditions. See Posner, supra note 14, at 834-44. No such
statements are possible about the vast majority of tax rules and sanctions.
2013] 569
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:523
This, of course, is a caricature, but it demonstrates an important
point. To the extent the persuasive power of law and economics
comes from references to ideal regimes (as it does in many other ar-
eas of economic regulation), the law and economics arguments in tax-
ation are weak. While this conclusion is hardly revolutionary even
among economists, 83 some of the leading tax law and economics
scholars continue to invoke the goal of welfare maximization in dis-
cussing the existing legal rules.184 To be sure, these invocations are
limited. Not many economically oriented tax scholars insist that we
interpret the economic substance doctrine or the straddle rules by
referencing the optimal regime. This, however, only reinforces the
point. Many commercial and corporate law scholars certainly do eval-
uate specific legal rules and sanctions by making this very
reference.18 5
183 Quite a few economists who have taken a sober look at the practical usefulness of
the optimal tax theory share this view. See, e.g., James Alm, What Is an "Optimal" Tax Sys-
tem2, 49 NAT'L TAXJ. 117, 117 (1996) ("This paper argues that previous attempts to derive
an 'optimal tax system' are largely irrelevant to practical tax design, because they typically
ignore a range of considerations reflecting fiscal and societal institutions that are essential
elements in the normative and positive analysis of taxation."); Creedy, supra note 159, at
497 ("[M]any of the strong results from [optimal] tax analyses . .. are best interpreted as
demonstrating that in fact they are most unlikely to apply in practice."); id. at 503 ("Ulti-
mately[,] . .. many of the results of [the optimal] tax analyses are negative or too broad to
offer specific policy guidance."); Piketty & Saez, supra note 170, at 1 ("Few economists
however seem to endorse such a radical policy agenda. Presumably this reflects a lack of
faith in the standard models and the zero-capital tax results. . . . We view the large gap
between optimal capital tax theory and practice as one of the most important failures of
modern public economics."); Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Litera-
ture, 6 J. PuB. EcON. 37, 45 (1976) ("Thus, although there do exist interesting cases in
which uniform taxation is optimal, these must definitely be considered as exceptions. In
the general case it is not easy to see the structure of taxation which follows from the gen-
eral optimality conditions."); Slemrod, supra note 79, at 167 ("Although optimal taxation
theory is useful for analyzing some aspects of [issues such as tax simplification, tax enforce-
ment, taxation of capital gains, value-added taxation, and accounting for inflation], in
many cases it cannot address the principal questions.").
184 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 86, at 137-38 (conceding that the analysis based on
comparisons of social welfare functions is "daunting," but asserting that "there really is no
other choice"); Daniel N. Shaviro, In Defense of Requiring Back-Flips, 26 VA. TAx REv. 815,
815 (2007) (asserting, in a brief response to Leo Katz's paper, that "socially optimal rules
(given all of the underlying constraints) might actually do the opposite [of what Katz as-
sumes they should do], by using filters that end up catching what are in some sense the less
bad transactions. This reflects that the rules' proper aim is not to make ethical judgments
about or between tax-motivated transactions, but to minimize overall social harm from
deadweight loss."); Weisbach, supra note 99, at 89-90 (critiquing the prevailing analysis of
anti-tax-avoidance doctrines as failing to articulate "the optimal content of the law," evalu-
ating the optimal content of these doctrines based on the assumption that "tax laws ...
maximize the welfare of . .. citizens").
185 See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 33, 40-41, 45, 53-54 (2003) (evaluating numerous models based on whether they
maximize social welfare and concluding by evaluating appropriateness of every existing
defense in actions involving liquidated damages from a welfarist perspective); Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note 131, at 441-42 n.5, 455-56 (grounding particular board struc-
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Another implication of the limits examined in the previous Part is
greater uncertainty regarding the appropriate place of distributional
considerations in the tax system design. Recall that the standard view
points to tax as the exclusive domain of redistribution.18 The tax sys-
tem is complex, however. Which part(s) of that system should deal
with distributive considerations? Deborah Schenk summarizes the
prevailing answer concisely: "Theoretically, the ideal distribution of
the tax burden could be maintained by [an] adjustment in the rates.
Thus, base changes can be considered independent of distributional
concerns."' 87 This conclusion allows Schenk to ignore distributive
questions while studying a reform of the realization requirement.
Weisbach relies on the same conclusion to exclude distributive issues
from his analysis of line drawing.s88 And Kaplow presents the most
general form of this argument while explaining (under certain as-
sumptions already mentioned) 8 9 why even in the presence of a nonop-
timal, nonlinear labor income tax differential commodity taxation
aimed at achieving distributive goals violates the Pareto principle. 90
While these scholars certainly recognize that the argument has limita-
tions,191 their overall suggestion is that, in Weisbach's words,
"[p]olicymakers should draw lines efficiently and use rates to redis-
tribute income." 9 2
Recognizing the limits of tax law and economics reveals an addi-
tional weakness of this approach. The fundamental reason for these
limits is the optimal tax theory's failure to incorporate distributive
considerations in a manner that reflects some deeply and widely held
beliefs. Given the theory's limitations, a suggestion that wide swaths
of the actual tax system should be designed while ignoring redistribu-
tion because that is what the theory prescribes does not appear to be
particularly persuasive. Why should we rely on one of the theory's
central conclusions if we cannot rely on the theory's overall results?
tures, greater reliance on independent directors in resolving conflicts of interest, and
proxy rule amendments, among other legal reforms, in the ultimate goal of maximizing
shareholder value, a goal which they justify as "best serv[ing]" social welfare); Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note 177, at 8-9 (listing further developments in that direction over the
past fifteen years); see also sources cited supra note 177; Kaplow, supra note 49, at 344.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
187 Schenk, supra note 99, at 519-20 (footnotes omitted).
188 See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1627, 1676-79 (1999).
189 See supra note 83.
190 See KAPLow, supra note 81, at 122-23 ("[A]s a first approximation and as a useful
benchmark for analysis, redistribution should be confined to the (labor] income tax and
direct transfer programs whereas other government policies (including potentially redis-
tributive commodity taxes and taxes on capital income] should be assessed solely on effi-
ciency grounds.").
191 See, e.g., id. at 135-41; Weisbach, supra note 188, at 1677-78.
192 Weisbach, supra note 188, at 1679.
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Fully appreciating the magnitude of the gap between the optimal
tax theory and the real tax system sheds light on another debate: the
disagreement about the need for (and even the coherence of) the
fundamental tax policy concept of horizontal equity. Some of the
leading public finance economists have tried for decades to provide a
rigorous theoretical foundation for the intuitively appealing norm
that likes should be treated alike.193 Kaplow argues that these efforts
are misguided, logically inconsistent, and violate the Pareto princi-
ple.19 4 The beauty of a social welfare function, he emphasizes, is that
it fully captures society's distributive preferences. Introducing any
other parameters affecting distribution is both unnecessary and
counterproductive. Therefore, horizontal equity should be under-
stood "as a proxy indicator that helps to identify potential problems in
the tax system,"1 95 such as incorrect measurement of the ideal tax
base.' 96 The way to address these problems, therefore, is through the
standard social welfare maximization analysis in which horizontal eq-
uity has no place.
Kaplow's critique is persuasive. But it becomes inapplicable as
soon as one abandons the ultimate goal of welfare maximization.
Once one concedes that answers based on SWF comparisons are prac-
tically unachievable and/or normatively contestable, horizontal equity
becomes a valuable criterion indeed. This criterion identifies ques-
tionable features of the tax system that may be evaluated based on
whatever approach one uses in order to assess incremental changes' 97
and however one resolves distributive questions.198 The continuing
and widespread use of horizontal equity in tax policy discussions,
therefore, is further evidence that the optimal tax theory has little im-
pact on the real-world tax policy.
Finally, the least dramatic, but perhaps most important, implica-
tion of the previous Part's analysis is the need to be especially careful
193 For a review, see Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, Tax Policy and Horizontal
Equity, in INEQUALITY AND TAx PoLIcy 44, 44-48 (Kevin A. Hassett & R. Glenn Hubbard
eds., 2001).
194 See Louis Kaplow, Commentary, in INEQUALITY AND TAx PoLicy, supra note 193, at 75,
81. The efforts to incorporate horizontal equity into the standard social welfare maximiza-
tion problem, he explains, are "in conflict with the very core of welfare economics." Id. at
91.
195 Id. at 85.
196 Id. at 89.
197 For a discussion of such an approach, see infra text accompanying notes 251-58.
198 Thus, when Kaplow argues that horizontal equity problems should be addressed
through "measure[s] . . . derived from the same principles that motivate our tax regime
and guide us in identifying the ideal tax base," Kaplow, supra note 194, at 89 (emphasis
added), he may be unduly optimistic about the commonality of principles underlying the
real tax system on the one hand and the optimal tax theory on the other. For a view that
horizontal equity is unhelpful even as a practical tool used by policynakers who do not
pursue the welfare optimization objective, see Schenk, supra note 99, at 519.
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when using (or interpreting) the single most essential word of law and
economics-efficiency. When the optimal tax literature argues that a
particular tax instrument is inefficient, the argument means that the
instrument is not part of the optimal system. This is exactly how the
word efficiency is used in the general law and economics scholarship.
Thus, an argument that certain price maintenance arrangements may
be efficient means that they may be part of a competitive (welfare-
maximizing) economy.'99 A suggestion that direct worker participa-
tion in corporate affairs is inefficient means that it moves the govern-
ance regime away from the welfare-maximizing one.200 More
examples are easily available. 20 ' Efficient means consistent with wel-
fare maximization.
But when tax scholars argue that certain foreign tax credit and
income deferral ruleS,2 0 2 realization rules,2 03 basis adjustment rules, 204
or interest taxation rules2 0 5 are inefficient, they cannot possibly refer
to the welfare maximization criterion. As the optimal tax system has
no national borders and no capital income tax, any reference to wel-
fare maximization in discussing all these issues would be completely
groundless. The meaningful interpretation of the term "inefficient"
in all these contexts would equate it with the term "distortive."20 6 This
interpretation by no means makes the claims about efficiency vacuous
or useless. But it certainly diminishes the normative power of effi-
ciency-based tax arguments compared to the identically worded argu-
ments made by law and economics scholars studying other areas of
economic regulation.
B. The Implications for Tax Enforcement
The disconnect between the optimal tax theory and the actual tax
system yields more startling results when the inquiry turns to tax en-
199 See Van Cayseele & Van den Bergh, supra note 131, at 467, 486-87.
200 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 131, at 445.
201 See, e.g., Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 185, at 45 ("The optimal contract thus con-
tains an implicit damage multiplier that can exceed one. Edlin therefore shows that penal-
ties sometimes are necessary to induce efficient investment." (emphasis added)); Posner,
supra note 14, at 834 (summarizing the normative strand of law and economics of contract
law as assuming that "contract law should be efficient," that is, consistent with "the optimal
outcome").
202 See Daniel Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYsIs 65, 68
(2011).
203 See Shaviro, supra note 102, at 5.
204 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes, 20 VA. TAx REV.
499, 511 (2001).
205 See David A. Weisbach, Reconsidering the Accrual of Interest Income, 78 TAXEs 36, 47
(2000).
206 Sometimes this interpretation is explicit, see, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 202, at 68;
Shaviro, supra note 102, at 5; Weisbach, supra note 205, at 47; sometimes it is not, see Burke
& McCouch, supra note 204, at 511.
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forcement, Yet again, the nonoptimality of the U.S. tax system's major
features, not to mention the myriad of particular rules, is at the core
of the problem.
Consider Daniel Shaviro's analysis of corporate tax shelters.207
He compares the so-called loss generators with the aggressive use of
derivatives. The problem with loss generators, he points out, is that
they reduce corporate tax rate only on certain investments that pro-
duce "shelterable taxable income."208 Derivatives, in contrast, reduce
this rate without creating allocative distortions, essentially amounting
to a corporate tax rate cut. 2 0 9 Given that difference, and implicitly
assuming that the loss generators and derivatives-based strategies are
equally likely to be illegal, Shaviro concludes: "[I]f I were a govern-
ment policymaker, I certainly would be inclined to focus more on the
loss generators than on [derivatives-based strategies] that arguably
promote [] a desirable aim."210 That aim is the elimination of an inef-
ficient corporate income tax.
This is a hesitant recommendation. Why focus on derivatives at
all if their use (even though possibly illegal) promotes a desirable aim
of corporate integration? The reason for the hesitation, no doubt, is
the conflict between Shaviro's commitment to welfare economics and
his commitment to the rule of law. Wojciech Kopczuk, an economist,
has no such conflict, so his conclusion is much more unequivocal. He
considers tax evasion by the poor and concludes that under certain
conditions it is socially desirable. 211 If having a relatively more pro-
gressive rate schedule makes a socially optimal amount of redistribu-
tion more costly than having a relatively less progressive schedule
combined with some tax evasion at the bottom of the income scale,
Kopczuk concludes, then allowing that evasion is optimal.212 Not just
acceptable (because, for instance, eliminating it would be costly), opti-
mal! Note that Kopczuk is not a revolutionary calling for an uprising
of the underprivileged class. His conclusion is a direct extension of
the optimal income tax framework.
The same logic inexorably applies to the question addressed by
Shaviro. If corporate tax is not part of the optimal tax system (and it
207 See Shaviro, supra note 62, at 452-53.
208 Id. at 452. Examples of such income include foreign-source passive income and
capital gains. Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 453.
211 The key factor is whether tax evasion (referred to by Kopczuk as "avoidance") be-
havior is heterogeneous and, if so, whether it varies among taxpayers of various ability
independently from the variation in their incomes. See Kopczuk, supra note 158, at 53-54.
212 See id. at 51, 61-68 (concluding that "[a]s long as avoidance is more easily accessi-
ble to individuals to whom one wants to redistribute income, its existence may be welfare
improving" and that "[u]nder these circumstances it is optimal not to eliminate avoidance
[such as a failure to report tip income], even though it might be costless to do so").
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certainly is not), the optimal taxpayer response to corporate tax is to
evade it. Moreover, the optimal government response to this evasion
is to allow it. The same is true of capital income tax more generally.
There is simply no need to enact rules dealing with derivatives, tax-
free hedging, or any other means of reducing the inefficient capital
income tax. Without such rules, taxpayers will escape this tax with
impunity, improving the tax system's efficiency. 213 This is hardly an
appealing conclusion for anyone with a J.D.
But suppose one follows in Shaviro's footsteps and declines to
endorse clear violations of the law on welfarist grounds. The limits of
tax law and economics extend to many less drastic arguments related
to tax enforcement as well. Many of these arguments are often made
by tax judges, lawyers, and legal academics, and they sound just like
the arguments frequently made in discussing enforcement of other
legal regimes. These arguments are presumed to be so self-evidently
correct that no justification is usually offered. Yet, while the argu-
ments about the appropriate design of rules and sanctions generally
have strong efficiency foundations, they lack such foundations when
made in the tax context.
One familiar argument is that in any threshold-type regime (that
is, in any regime that involves a line separating legal from illegal be-
havior) policymakers should exercise restraint in designing the
threshold. If the speed limit is set at twenty miles per hour, if the
environmental regulation demands zero emissions, many actions
whose marginal (private and social) benefits exceed marginal (private
and social) costs would be illegal and deterred by a threat of sanc-
tions.214 This would be a clearly inefficient result. For irredeemably
inefficient acts, if every contemporaneous price increase is treated as
collusive, if any unhappy customer accusing her broker of churning
receives damages, a lot of socially useful economic activity will be neg-
atively affected.2 15 All these examples remind policymakers about the
danger of overdeterrence-the possibility of reducing social welfare as
a result of overbroad rules.
213 Weisbach offers four possible reasons to deter tax evasion of inefficient taxes. See
Weisbach, supra note 99, at 111-12. He recognizes, however, that the reasons are "specula-
tive" and may or may not stand up to greater scrutiny. Id. at 111. Moreover, three out of
the four reasons rely on considerations that are well beyond the basic analysis supporting
reform proposals in most areas of economic regulation.
214 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and Practical Dilemmas ofan Underground Econ-
omy, 103 YALE L.J. 2157, 2171 (1994) (criticizing the Superfund rules as "a system of mas-
sive overdeterrence in which private parties are asked to spend thousands of dollars in
order to avoid pennies' worth of environmental harm").
215 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 49, at 366-70.
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The concern with overbroad rules is a constant refrain in tax pol-
icy debates,216 but it cannot be justified in the mannerjust described.
While it is indeed inefficient to set the highway speed limit at twenty
miles per hour and to treat all contemporaneous price increases as
collusive, it is not necessarily inefficient to require taxpayers to recog-
nize gains from hedging their appreciated securities (to continue with
an earlier example) if they eliminate all, most, or only some of their
economic exposure. The partial hedging rule protects the realization
requirement, which is itself part of the capital income tax. Let us as-
sume that making this rule stricter would lead to a greater overall tax
burden on capital income. 217 Could this burden become too high,
just like the speed limit could become too low?
This question has no clear answer. Without a theory of taxation
of capital income and a theory of realization-based (rather than ac-
crual-based) taxation, how can one decide what tax burden is too high
or when realizations are too frequent? While the canonical optimal
tax theory has no tax on capital income, it is far from clear that reduc-
ing the existing capital income tax is a welfare-increasing move, espe-
cially when it is accomplished by the change in partial hedging rules
rather than an across-the-board cut in the capital gains tax rate.218
Turning from the claims about the content of legal rules to the
arguments about the design of tax sanctions brings no relief. One
such argument is that slight violations should face light punishment
while egregious violations should be subject to severe sanctions.2 19
216 See, e.g., James N. Calvin et al., Examining the Straddle Rules After 25 Years, 125 TAX
Noms 1301, 1305-06 (2009) (criticizing the overbreadth of straddle rules); Marie Sapirie,
Final Foreign Tax Credit Generator Regulations Released, 132 TAX NoTEs 227, 227 (2011) (re-
porting on concern with the overbroad foreign tax credit generator regulations); Freder-
ick N. Vinson, Overhauling the Taxation of Financial Derivatives Transactions, 132 TAX NoTEs
1369, 1370 (2011) (stating that "the passive activity loss rules have been heavily criticized as
overbroad").
217 If it does not, there is clearly no reason for concern with an overbroad rule as it has
no effect on the tax burden, or even lightens it.
218 Importantly, this is not an argument suggesting that the partial hedging rule
should (or should not) be expanded. Rather, it is an assertion that one cannot argue in
favor of limiting the breadth of tax anti-avoidance rules by invoking the optimal tax
regime.
219 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978) ("[Slalutary
and procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct might
be shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty
regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even a good-faith error of judg-
ment."); Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?,
61 TUL. L. REv. 777, 780, 839 (1987) (explaining that heavy sanctions discourage efficient
behavior by imposing a cost on "playing it too close to the line" and that making treble
damages discretionary would reduce damages in cases presenting close questions of law or
fact). The same argument is routinely made in the tax setting. See, e.g., Texas State Bar Tax
Section Comments on Proposal to Require Reporting of Uncertain Tax Positions, 2010 TNT 105-22
("Large penalties such as those imposed under Sections 6707 or 6707A, applicable only in
circumstances that the Service considers potentially abusive, are inappropriate for a disclo-
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While terms like "egregious" (and its many synonyms and antonyms)
are used in several different ways, many commentators differentiate
between slight violations that barely cross the legality threshold and
egregious violations that are far removed from this threshold.220 If
the law is uncertain, slight violations have a substantial chance to be
found legal on review while egregious ones are almost certainly
illegal.221
The argument in favor of light sanctions for slight violations may
make sense if legal rules are (roughly) socially optimal. Imagine that
a fifty-five miles per hour highway speed limit is optimal. This means
that, on average, the marginal benefit of driving at fifty-five miles per
hour is equal to its marginal cost, while for higher speeds, the cost
exceeds the benefit. If so, it is quite plausible to assume that the
higher the speed above the limit, the greater the excess of the social
cost over social benefit. In order to deter increasingly costly behavior
(more egregious speeding), higher speeds should lead to higher fines,
as they usually do.2 22 Penalties for violating the RCRA physical barrier
requirement reveal a similar pattern.223
The same argument makes little sense in tax. Suppose that the
partial hedging rule prohibits taxpayers from hedging "substantially
all" of their economic exposure to the appreciated security, and as-
sume that the term "substantially all" is generally interpreted to mean
something around 90%. Needless to say, no one can possibly claim
that the "substantially all" rule is socially optimal-precisely, roughly,
or even remotely. Therefore, there is nothing to say about the social
cost of hedging 89%, 91%, or 99.9% of economic exposure.
Whatever considerations may support heavier sanction in the latter
case, efficiency is not one of them, at least not for the same clear rea-
sure requirement applied routinely and broadly to so many taxpayers, except in the most
egregious circumstances.").
220 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Pices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1544 (1983)
("Intentional fault is gross because once the injurer decides to disobey the legal standard it
pays to fall far short of it.").
221 SeeJohn E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 980 (1984) ("In most situations where the defendant
can choose from a range of possible actions, the probability of being held liable varies with
the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct.").
222 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws. ch. 90, § 20 (2010) (imposing increasing fines for greater
speeds in excess of the speed limit). This explanation is incomplete, but it suffices to
demonstrate the close connection between the design of sanctions and the fundamental
problem of negative externalities in the world of transaction costs. The reason for incom-
pleteness is that even a fixed statutory fine produces graduated expected sanctions if the
law is uncertain (as it always is) because substantial violations are more likely to be found
illegal on review than the minor ones. See Raskolnikov, supra note 3, at 25-26.
223 See U.S. EPA, RCRA CIVIL PENALY PoucY 18 (2003), available at http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/rcra/rcpp2003-fnl.pdf. Under these guidelines,
'major" deviations are subject to sanctions that are as much as one hundred times higher
than fines for "minor" deviations. See id.
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sons that support graduated speeding fines and environmental
penalties.
Many other familiar arguments about penalties and enforcement
encounter similar problems for similar reasons when made in the tax
context. It is not at all clear why light punishment in close cases is
justified by tax law's uncertainty,224 by the possibility that the taxpayer
may have been right,2 25 or by the social benefit of converting unclear
standards into clear rules that arises from taxpayers taking plausible
but uncertain positions.226 All these arguments falter because while
there is indeed a social benefit from resolving uncertainty by con-
verting a vague "reasonable speed" standard into a precise-and so-
cially optimal-fifty-five miles per hour rule, there is no benefit from
converting a vague "substantially all" tax hedging standard into a
more precise "90% of total economic exposure" rule. The reason is
painfully obvious by now: in contrast with the speeding example,
neither the vague tax standard nor the clear tax rule has any connec-
tion to optimality. If so, there is nothing to be gained from converting
one into another while the real social costs of tax litigation needed to
accomplish this conversion clearly reduce social welfare.
Even the seemingly unassailable conclusion that tax penalties
should take the amount of tax underpayment into account is in doubt
given the disconnect between the actual and the optimal tax systems.
While the link between the magnitude of sanctions and the external
harm from the offense is at the core of the general economic analysis
224 This is a common justification in tax and elsewhere. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexan-
der, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1513 (1996) (ad-
dressing the argument that fairly high sanctions should not be imposed for securities law
violations if "the standard of conduct cannot be made sufficiently clear"); Gergen, supra
note 99, at 278 ("[Flew support imposing severe sanctions for violations of indeterminate
legal standards."); Marie Sapirie & Shamik Trivedi, Economic Substance Directive Limits Strct
Liability Penalties, 132 TAX NOTES 339, 340 (2011) (citing a practitioner expressing a similar
view).
225 See Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corpo-
rate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 240 (Wolfgang Sch6n ed., 2008);
ABA Tax Section Recommends Overhaul of Tax Penalty Regime, 2009 TNT 75-25 (stating as one
of its guiding principles the proposition that "[penalties should not be imposed to punish
conduct which is proper, reasonable, appropriate, or not clearly prohibited"). John Calfee
and Richard Craswell expressed a similar point by asserting that "a positive (or, at least,
non-negative) correlation between the likelihood of liability and the social costs of a defen-
dant's behavior could be the definition of a minimally rational legal system." Calfee &
Craswell, supra note 221, at 970.
226 For an example of this argument in the tax setting, see M. Carr Ferguson, How to
Save the Corporate Income Tax, 132 TAX NOTES 951, 952 (2011). For the general argument,
see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 236 (1979) ("Rule creation [through development of precedent] is not desired in
itself . .. but is a means of particularizing the standards of socially desired behavior in
order to promote compliance with them."). Richard Posner's current views about the com-
mon law's ability to develop efficient rules are fairly pessimistic. See Anthony Niblett et al.,
The Evolution of a Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 330 (2010).
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of deterrence,227 the connection between the external harm and the
magnitude of tax underpayment is extremely weak. The external
harm from a tax-motivated act is the cost of raising the revenue lost
due to that act plus the amount of the money transfer (the tax sav-
ings). The first component of this sum is very difficult to measure,
making the first-best, harm-based sanctions unrealistic. This problem
is not unique to taxation, however. A familiar second-best solution is
to base sanctions on plaintiffs losses rather than on the external
harms from the defendant's conduct.228 Because the loss in the tax
setting is the underpayment of tax, loss-based tax sanctions would tie
the amount of penalty to the magnitude of the underpayment. This is
precisely what the Internal Revenue Code does. 229
Unfortunately, this second-best solution is particularly implausi-
ble in tax. The plaintiffs loss is often the main (or at least a signifi-
cant) component of the external harm from securities, antitrust,
environmental, and other violations. But the plaintiffs (i.e., the gov-
ernment's) loss of tax dollars is a very poor proxy for the overall exter-
nal harm from tax underpayments.
Imagine a simple tax regime consisting of a wage tax (of a kind
envisioned by the optimal tax theory) and a capital income tax of any
kind. Consider whether a penalty for a $200 understatement should
be greater than a penalty for a $100 understatement. It should if the
external harm in the former case is greater than in the latter.230 Is
this likely to be the case?
To answer this question, we need to know what type of income
would be taxed less due to the understatement. A reduction in tax on
labor income is clearly socially costly, but a reduction in capital in-
come tax may not be.2 3 ' Moreover, we need to know what is the gov-
ernment's response to the understatement. If the government
responds to a reduction in capital income tax by increasing tax on
labor income, the understatement moves the system toward the opti-
mum and may be socially beneficial. If the government responds to a
227 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 180 (1968).
228 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (establishing liability for any person "injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" equal to "three-
fold the damages [i.e., losses] by him sustained"); Alexander, supra note 224, at 1490 (ex-
plaining that the damages recoverable by investors under Section 11 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 are based on calculations of hypothetical losses in-
curred by investors).
229 See I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6662A, 6663 (2006).
230 This statement ignores possible variations in various probabilities (such as the
probability of detection and the probability of conviction). This is done both to simplify
the exposition and because no general statement regarding these probabilities can be
made.
231 This may be so because the optimal system does not tax capital income. See Mankiw
et al., supra note 72, at 167. The hesitation is due to the second-best problem.
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reduction in labor income tax with an increase in tax on capital in-
come, the social cost is likely to be large because the "right" income is
taxed less while the "wrong" income is taxed more than before. So
should a penalty for a $200 understatement be greater than the sanc-
tion for a $100 understatement in this simple system? It depends.
Our actual tax system is immensely more complex than the one
just considered. The uncertainties discussed in the previous para-
graph pale in comparison to the uncertainties arising from the real-
life tax avoidance and evasion. Yet it is impossible to make any gener-
alizations about the social cost of tax understatements without know-
ing what kind of income is taxed less and how the government
responds to this tax reduction. Therefore, the link between the size of
a tax understatement and the magnitude of the related penalty is diffi-
cult to defend.
These are sobering conclusions. The gap between the canonical
optimal tax theory and the real world of taxation affects the economic
analysis of every aspect of the tax system. It has significant implica-
tions for the meaning of the basic economic concepts, the design of
the fundamental structural features, the breadth of every legal rule
found in the Internal Revenue Code, and the evaluation of responses
to tax avoidance and evasion. As the next section explains, the impli-
cations of this gap extend well beyond tax.
C. The Implications for the Economic Analysis of Law
Recall that the great goal of the law and economics' normative
project is to design optimal regulatory regimes. The specific sugges-
tions aimed at accomplishing this goal are most persuasive if the ex-
isting regulatory systems are fairly close to the ideal ones. At least in
certain areas dealing with economic regulation, this relatively close
connection appears plausible. Until one thinks about taxes.
For instance, securities law scholars typically assume that the U.S.
capital markets are generally efficient. This assumption is much less
realistic, however, if one remembers that the U.S. tax rules reduce
market liquidity,232 preference some assets over others,233 lead to crea-
tion of financial instruments that would not exist in a tax-free
world, 2 3 4 and so on. One may still argue that capital markets are effi-
232 The so-called lock-in effect resulting from the realization requirement induces tax-
payers to retain their appreciated assets well past the point when they would have liked to
sell them. See, e.g., Yoseph M. Edrey, Wat Are Capital Gains and Losses Anyway?, 24 VA. TAX
REv. 141, 172 (2004).
233 Tax-exempt bonds, for instance, have a preferential tax treatment, as do growth
stocks compared to dividend-paying stocks.
234 See, e.g., Schler, supra note 133, at 355 (describing contingent convertible debt that
is very similar to ordinary convertible debt except for the additional contingency added
solely to achieve a better tax result).
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cient in the sense that they reflect all available information (including
the tax rules). But a claim that these markets allocate capital to its
highest valuing users2 3 5 cannot be defended once one takes taxes into
account. Economists recognized long ago that this line of reasoning
extends to the analysis of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, optimal anti-
monopolization policies, and so on.2 3 6 Thus, the argument that the
second-best problems exist in many areas of economic regulation is
not new. Perhaps these problems may not appear particularly severe
as long as one limits the inquiry just to competition policy, corporate
law, or securities regulation. But the second-best problems certainly
loom large once one remembers that distortionary and highly subop-
timal taxes are certain to affect the behavior of relevant individuals
and firms. 23 7
Another fundamental problem of law and economics' social op-
timization project has to do with redistribution. As the redistributive
solution produced by the optimal tax theory fails to reflect actual re-
distributive policy, the claim that the tax and transfer system is the
only appropriate redistributive domain comes into question. If so, the
vast amount of law and economics scholarship that has ignored redis-
tribution in assessing (and attempting to reform) corporate, commer-
cial, competition, and securities law238 suffers from a significant
deficiency. So it is hardly surprising that one of the leading Chicago-
school economists concludes that "[tlhe failure to develop a satisfac-
tory framework within which to analyze redistribution makes law and
economics analytically incomplete."2 39 The challenges of tax law and
235 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1074 (1990).
236 See, e.g., David M. Newbery, Growth, Externalities and Taxation, 37 ScOT.J. POL. EcoN.
305, 319-24 (1990) (explaining why tax-induced distortions are likely to have complex and
varying interdependencies with trade policy, competition policy, and externalities).
Jagdish Bhagwati made the point most emphatically by pointing out that even activities that
are definitely inefficient may increase social welfare given their interaction with preexisting
distortions. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, 90 J.
POL. EcON. 988, 992 (1982) (giving examples of the "paradox of beneficial outcome" from
definitely undesirable profit-seeking activities as well as a related "subsidiary paradox").
237 The reverse is also true and well understood in public economics. See, e.g, Stiglitz,
supra note 151, at 1036 ("The optimal tax structure thus might be markedly different in an
economy with monopolies, externalities, and other imperfections."). Needless to say, this
realization further weakens the normative power of tax policy arguments made by refer-
ence to social welfare maximization.
238 See David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 439 (2003) ("The overwhelming majority of law and economics scholarship looks
solely to efficiency to evaluate legal rules.").
239 JamesJ. Heckman, Commentary, The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics Move-
ment, 15 LAw & HisT. REv. 327, 332 (1997). The reason for this failure is, no doubt, the
difficulty of incorporating redistributive concerns into efficiency-based analysis of legal
rules.
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economics, it turns out, have profound implications for the entire law
and economics movement.
III
BEYOND THE LIMITs
The limits of tax law and economics are, no doubt, substantial.
But they are not all-encompassing. They do not affect many research
agendas in public economics. Nor do they extend to all economic
analysis of tax rules and sanctions.
A. The Benefits of the Economic Analysis of Taxation
To begin with, the optimal tax theory itself is not cast in stone.
References to the "canonical" or "classic" optimal tax theory through-
out this Article are not verbiage. A serious effort is underway to reex-
amine the theory's fundamental conclusions in order to make them
more relevant to the real world. Scholars are developing a "realistic,
tractable, and robust theory of socially optimal capital taxation."2 4 0
They are reexamining the traditional assumptions that are responsible
for some of the unrealistic theoretical results.241 New research is re-
considering whether some easily observable taxpayer characteristics
provide unique information about ability, with intriguing and some-
what unexpected conclusions. 242 Recent work incorporates a more
nuanced understanding of individuals' responses to taxation. Again,
the findings challenge the accepted wisdom.243 For those interested
in improving the actual tax system, these are promising trends. If suc-
cessful, these developments may free tax law and economics from its
limitations, or at least loosen them.
240 Piketty & Saez, supra note 170, at 1. Importantly, the theory being developed ad-
dresses not only the optimal taxation of capital income but the optimal taxation of capital
transfers as well. See alsoJuan Carlos Conesa et al., Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!,
99 AM. EcON. REv. 25, 26 (2009) (developing a model in which "endogenous labor sup-
plied differentially over the life cycle is crucial in driving" the conclusion that capital in-
come should be taxed at a high flat rate).
241 The assumptions being reexamined include the lognormal distribution of high-end
abilities, see Diamond & Saez, supra note 80, at 168-71, and the irrelevance of the extensive
margin elasticity of labor supply, see id. at 175-77.
242 SeeJukka Pirttila & Ilpo Suoniemi, Public Provision, Commodity Demand and Hours of
Work: An Empirical Analysis 19-20 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 3000, 2010), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1582847; Roger H. Gordon & Wojciech Kopczuk, The Choice of the
Personal Income Tax Base 9 (Aug. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author). For instance, it appears that rather than allowing a deduction for property taxes,
we should increase income tax liability of taxpayers with higher property tax payments. See
id.
243 See Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss?
The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance, I AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 31, 31 (2009) (argu-
ing that "the efficiency cost of taxing high income individuals is not necessarily large de-
spite evidence that their reported incomes are highly sensitive to marginal tax rates.").
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The empirical tax research is also invaluable (even if often con-
troversial). Estimating labor supply elasticity sheds light on the funda-
mental tradeoff between redistribution and distortion. 244 Measuring
taxable income elasticity reveals the extent of all individual responses
to taxation. 245 And determining the salience of various tax instru-
ments helps policymakers to account for taxpayers' deviations from
rational behavior (in the technical sense of this term).246 The benefits
of this and similar work are too obvious to require further elabora-
tion. They are also largely unaffected by the conclusions reached in
the previous Part.
Furthermore, economic analysis remains extremely useful in re-
vealing the interplay between the tax rules, microeconomics and fi-
nance theory, and the actions of rational taxpayers. The resulting
insights include understanding (under certain assumptions) the in-
centives for deferral, 247 the equivalence of a current deduction of an
investment with a tax exemption of the investment's yield,248 and the
ability of individuals to escape income taxation of risky returns, 249 to
name a few.25 0 These and similar contributions are undiminished by
the limitations of the optimal tax theory.
The economic analysis of incremental reforms is also promising.
The marginal efficiency cost of funds approach (and the related taxa-
ble income elasticity analysis) provides policymakers with a method of
choosing among a large menu of possible revenue raising measures,
including changes in legal rules, sanctions, rates, and so on. The
MECF approach explicitly disavows claims to optimality focusing only
on incremental (that is, marginal) changes instead.251 This limited
goal makes the conclusions more robust and more practical.
244 See Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax
Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIr. 3, 3 (2012).
245 See Chetty, supra note 243, at 31.
246 See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON.
REv. 1145, 1175 (2009).
247 See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 23-25, 61-64
(2005).
248 See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EM-
PLOYMENT AND PULIC Pouct ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 302 (1948). For a
review, see David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2005).
249 See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-
Taking, 58 Q.J. EcON. 388, 391-92 (1944). For a review, see Weisbach, supra note 248, at
8-19.
250 Another example of this work is the model demonstrating that (under certain as-
sumptions) a particular presumptive taxation regime taxes capital income in the same
manner as this income is taxed under the realization requirement while avoiding the dis-
torting lock-in effect produced by realization. See Alan J. Auerbach & David F. Bradford,
Generalized Cash-Fow Taxation, 88J. Pus. ECON. 957, 958-59, 975 (2004); Alan J. Auerbach,
Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 167, 167-69, 177-78 (1991).
251 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 122, at 175.
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It is important, however, to appreciate the limitations of the
MECF analysis. First, it is not entirely clear which real-life policy
changes are incremental. 252 Second, the MECF calculations depend
on the marginal value to the taxpayer of a dollar of tax saved-a pa-
rameter that requires context-specific empirical estimation.2 5 Third,
because the MECF framework is built on the assumption that private
and social costs are identical, it cannot incorporate externalities and
even fines into the analysis. 254 Fourth, the conclusion that the govern-
ment may lower the overall deadweight loss by reducing its reliance
on high-MECF instruments and increasing its reliance on low-MECF
instruments is rigorously proven only when the instruments in ques-
tion are various excise taxes. As Terrance O'Reilly emphasized,
whether the same conclusion holds for other policy instruments is far
from clear.25 5
Finally, the MECF measures only the efficiency cost of raising reve-
nue. A broader concept called the marginal cost of funds is designed
to balance efficiency and equity. The marginal cost of funds "is just
the MECF . . . weighted to reflect distributional consequences." 2 5 6
While this explanation appears quite straightforward, the requisite
weighting is nothing of the kind. It was first proposed in a brief essay
forty years ago 2 5 7 and remains largely undeveloped to this day. Many
of the difficulties with incorporating redistribution into the optimal
tax theory arise in specifying the marginal cost of funds as well.25 8 Not
surprisingly, a recent book dedicated entirely to the marginal cost of
funds analysis spends about three pages on distributional issues with-
out reaching any firm conclusions.259
252 The intuition underlying this approach-that government should pursue tax policy
instruments that allow it to raise additional revenue at the lowest social cost-applies to
nonincremental changes as well. See Shaw et al., supra note 126, at 1108 n.4. Reliance on
an intuition, however, is not the same as a grounding in a precise economic theory.
253 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 122, at 187.
254 See Shaw et al., supra note 126, at II11.
255 See O'Reilly, supra note 76, at 614-15.
256 See Shaw et al., supra note 126, at 1110.
257 See Martin S. Feldstein, Distributional Equity and the Optimal Structure of Public hices,
62 Am. EcON. REv. 32 (1972). In a paper published just a few years later, Feldstein ex-
pressed considerable reservations about the possibility of balancing equity and efficiency
considerations in the analysis of incremental reforms (as opposed to the optimal tax the-
ory). See Feldstein, supra note 179, at 99-100 ("The problem of selecting the optimal . . .
extent of partial reform requires balancing the traditional welfare loss against the horizon-
tal inequities of arbitrary individual losses. There is no clearly compelling procedure for
such a balancing, nothing that follows naturally from traditional economic theory in the
way that the generalized utilitarian criterion . . . does for balancing traditional efficiency
and distributional concerns.").
258 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 122, at 190-92 (concluding that incorporating
vertical equity into the analysis requires a choice of SWF or distributional weights and that
taking account of other aspects of fairness and justice may be impossible altogether).
259 See DAHLBY, supra note 116, at 38-42.
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In short, the MECF is not a silver bullet. But it is a valuable tool
that allows economists to evaluate (even if roughly) the efficiency im-
plications of many real reforms. Presumably, democratically elected
policymakers may then incorporate distributional preferences of the
electorate into the tax reform analysis however they can. While disa-
greement about the appropriate extent of redistribution is all but as-
sured, any reasonable tax reformer should be interested in the
economic costs of various policy options. The MECF analysis can pro-
vide the reformer with estimates of these costs.
The research agendas just described have already yielded many
valuable insights and promise to reveal many more. But scholars pur-
suing these agendas are economists, not lawyers. They neither have
nor need a deep and comprehensive understanding of legal rules and
sanctions. At the same time, most economically sophisticated tax law-
yers cannot match the level of empirical and modeling skills of the
leading public finance economists. 260 It makes no sense for tax law
and economics scholars to circumvent the limits of their field by at-
tempting to become economists themselves. This does not mean,
however, that it is futile for these scholars to pursue economic analysis
of tax law, as discussed next.
B. The Enduring Value of Tax Law and Economics
The first area of research where tax law and economics can be
(and has been) productive becomes obvious as soon as one concludes
that the most useful tool offered by economists to policymakers is the
MECF (and similar) analysis. That analysis depends on comparing
projected and actual revenue changes resulting from incremental re-
forms. In order to perform this comparison, an analyst must know
what reforms are possible and how taxpayers are likely to respond to
them. Economists can give only very rudimentary answers to each of
these questions because they lack detailed knowledge of tax rules and
the ways these rules work in practice. Economically sophisticated tax
scholars, in contrast, are experts in both areas.
Economists examine the tax system from sixty thousand feet. At
that altitude, they can discern only a few potential incremental adjust-
ments such as slight changes in tax rates or audit rates. But a repeal of
the capital gains preference, a switch from realization-based to mark-
to-market taxation, or corporate integration, to take just some exam-
ples, are not incremental changes. The MECF approach is ill suited
260 Thus, it is not surprising-and is entirely sensible-that empirically trained tax law
academics study the court system rather than the tax system. See NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDI-
CIAL POWER OF THE PURSE: How COURTS FUND NATIONAL DEFENSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS 2-9
(2011).
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for their evaluation. Moreover, dramatic changes are rarely possible
as a practical matter.
Needless to say, there are plenty of possible reforms that are both
incremental and realistic. For instance, instead of evaluating an adop-
tion of the mark-to-market taxation, one may inquire into the margi-
nal efficiency cost of raising revenue by strengthening the already
discussed hedging rules,261 or the wash sale rules,262 or the straddle
rules,2 6 3 each of which are essential to having a meaningful realization
requirement. In order to do this, however, one needs to know all of
these rules quite well. Very few economists have heard about any of
them, none (I would guess) understands them in great detail. With-
out this understanding, it is impossible to evaluate the distortionary
costs of changing these rules.
To be sure, many tax academics who are not enthralled by eco-
nomic analysis have a full mastery of these rules. But ignoring eco-
nomic reasoning would lead these academics to miss the rules'
essential common feature-the fact that all of them are risk based.264
While these academics may analyze the rules by inquiring into con-
gressional intent, discerning the structure of the Internal Revenue
Code, or trying to determine what it really means to sell an asset, tax
law and economics scholars focus on the risk-bearing deadweight loss
the rules impose. Needless to say, this loss-along with other costs-
must be taken into account in evaluating the distortive effects of these
rules and the likely MECF of their revision.
Deep knowledge of tax rules is not the only comparative advan-
tage of tax law and economics scholars. Equally valuable is their so-
phisticated understanding of taxpayer responses to these rules.
Without it, an analyst undertaking the MECF-type analysis engages in
pure speculation. For example, one cannot estimate the distortions
produced by adoption of the so-called Flat TaX2 6 5 unless one realizes
how easy it will be for taxpayers to plan around it. But in order to
anticipate these tax reduction strategies, one needs to be steeped in
the existing tax minimization techniques. One also needs to under-
stand the economic effects of the Flat Tax on domestic and cross-bor-
der transactions-something that requires a fair bit of economic
thinking. Not surprisingly, tax law and economics scholars made ex-
tremely valuable contributions to evaluating the Flat Tax proposal-
261 I.R.C. § 1259 (2006).
262 Id. § 1091.
263 Id. § 1092.
264 See Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 1181, 1205 (2008); id. at 1183 (defining risk-based rules as "provisions that grant tax
benefits only to those who accept a certain amount of risk").
265 See ROBERT E. HALL & ALvIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAx (2d ed. 1995); see also The
Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. (1995).
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contributions that required their unique combination of skills. 26 6
That skill set also allowed economically sophisticated tax academics to
assume leading roles in the studies of corporate integration,267 realiza-
tion,2 68 and financial instruments reform.269
The same is true for more modest regulatory changes. If one
wants to evaluate the cost of raising revenue by adjusting the hedging
rules, one needs to understand the frictions that constrain tax plan-
ning around these rules.270 One also needs to realize that these are
risk-based rules giving rise to a unique form of tax planning (and a
unique social cost) that may or may not be affected by a particular
rule change.27 1 Again, the analyst needs to understand how compli-
cated rules work in practice while focusing on the resulting distor-
tions-something that tax law and economics scholars are especially
equipped to do.
Another major research agenda for which tax law and economics
scholars are well suited is the study of tax avoidance. Not as this term
is understood by economists, but as it is used by lawyers, policymakers,
and the Internal Revenue Code. Economists use the term avoidance
to describe legal responses to taxation, contrasting it with evasion,
which is clearly illegal.2 72 While economists occasionally mention a
gray area of legal uncertainty between evasion and avoidance, forty
266 SeeJoseph Bankman & Michael L. Schler, Tax Planning Under the Flat Tax, in TAXING
CAPITAL INCOME 245 (HenryJ. Aaron et al. eds., 2007); David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the
Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 600-03 (2000.
267 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPo-
RATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992), reprinted in MichaelJ. Graetz &
Alvin C. Warren, INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES: THE
TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE REPORTS (1998); William D. Andrews,
Reporter's Study of the Taxation of Corporate Distributions, in AM. LAw INST., FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS
AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS (1982); Edward D. Kleinbard, Design-
ing and Income Tax on Capital Income, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME (HenryJ. Aaron et al. eds.,
2007); ALVIN C. WARREN,JR., AM. LAw INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF
THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTE-
GRATION (1993).
268 See Schenk, supra note 99, at 518.
269 See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Balance in Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for
Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1886, 1890 (2004); Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the
Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REv. 243, 245 (1992); Jeff Strnad, Taxing New
Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REv. 569, 569 (1993).
270 See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLU. L. REV.
1312, 1396 (2001).
271 See Raskolnikov, supra note 264, at 1205.
272 Thus, failing to report cash income and claiming nonexistent dependents is eva-
sion; working less or buying tax-exempt bonds is avoidance.
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years of economic modeling of tax enforcement have failed to pro-
duce any scholarship exploring that gray area.27 3
Needless to say, that gray area is of great interest to legal academ-
ics. It is the focus of the vast literature on tax shelters. It continues to
command significant attention from Congress, the Treasury Depart-
ment, and the IRS.2 7 4 And there is no reason to expect that this gray
area-which tax academics call avoidance (in contrast with legal tax
planning) -is likely to diminish in importance any time soon. So it is
no surprise that tax law and economics scholars have been at the fore-
front of the economic analysis of legal (specifically, tax) uncer-
tainty.27 5 While no consensus about the appropriate structure of tax
sanctions and other enforcement tools has emerged thus far, our un-
derstanding of available options and tradeoffs has been greatly en-
hanced by this analysis.
The third comparative advantage of tax law and economics schol-
ars is institutional. Public finance economists inhabit an intellectual
environment characterized by diverse areas of substantive inquiry that
are examined with a uniform conceptual approach. In contrast, tax
law and economics scholars are inevitably exposed to historical, philo-
sophical, political, and doctrinal analyses, to name a few. This is true
even if one focuses on tax scholarship, not to mention the range of
methodological commitments in the legal academy as a whole. To the
extent that real-life policy choices are determined by an agglomera-
tion of political, economic, historical, and other considerations, tax
law and economics scholars have a comparative advantage over public
finance economists in combining rigorous economic theory with
noneconomic concerns.276 Examples of this work are easy to find.2 77
273 A recent work-in-progress is one of the very few attempts to change this state of
affairs. See David Ulph, Avoidance Policies-A New Conceptual Framework (Oxford Univ., Ctr.
for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 09/22, 2009) (on file with author).
274 The continuing saga with the codification of the economic substance doctrine is
the prime example. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Living with the Codified Economic Substance
Doctrine, 128 TAX NOTEs 731, 731 (2010).
275 A few examples of this substantial and growing literature include Mark P. Gergen,
Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAx L. REv. 453(2011); Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1017 (2009); Logue, supra note 8; Shaviro, supra note 225; Raskolnikov, supra note 12.
276 This is not a new point. See, e.g., Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship:
Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNEu. L. REv. 365, 390 (1998).
277 One example is Michael Graetz's reinvigoration of the debate about choosing na-
tional rather than worldwide welfare as a basis for economic analysis (in which Graetz
considered historical, political, and fairness-based arguments). See Graetz, supra note 172,
at 284. Another example is Alvin Warren's classic debate with William Andrews about the
choice between an income and a consumption tax (in which Warren focused on the inter-
action of economic analysis with fairness-based and broader political theory considera-
tions). See Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE
L.J. 1081, 1081-83 (1980).
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Finally, economically sophisticated tax academics are particularly
well positioned to explain economic theories in terms accessible to a
broader legal audience and to examine the assumptions underlying
these theories. Economic models of taxation are complex, the mean-
ing of their assumptions is far from obvious, and the inevitable profes-
sional lingo is a challenge to the uninitiated. For instance, what
exactly does it mean, as the earlier-quoted MECF discussion stated,
that the tax optimization problem is "well-behaved"?278
Some of the best work in tax law and economics has been in this
"explain and explore" genre. Not surprisingly, there is a vigorous de-
bate about the robustness of the models, the applicability of their pre-
scriptions, and the realism of their assumptions. 279 But for obvious
reasons, this debate is invaluable in advancing our understanding of
the economic analysis of taxation and its implications for tax policy
and tax reform.
This discussion does not necessarily cover every area of research
where tax law and economics may succeed despite its limitations.
There is no need for an exhaustive enumeration. Considering just
the agendas discussed here leads one to an inevitable conclusion: tax
law and economics is a viable and valuable field of study that is vitally
important for the project of improving our tax system.
CONCLUSION
This Article explains the limits of tax law and economics, identi-
fies their origins, and explores their implications. For those who re-
ject the basic assumptions underlying the economic analysis of law,
this Article's inquiry misses the point. For the rest, the Article's main
suggestion is to take the normative claims about the design of tax
rules and sanctions with a large grain of salt when these claims are
based on references to the optimal tax system.
What follows from this suggestion is not paralysis but a shift in
focus. Many changes to the actual tax system are incremental and
should be evaluated as such. A deep knowledge of tax law and a so-
phisticated understanding of tax planning are crucial for an informed
economic analysis of incremental reforms. Tax law and economics
scholars are uniquely well positioned to perform this analysis. An eco-
nomic study of legal uncertainty and tax avoidance is another area
278 See supra text accompanying note 127.
279 See, e.g.,Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consump-
tion Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1413, 1414-17 (2006); Chris William
Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAX L.
REv. 867, 867-68 (2010); Chris William Sanchirico, Tax Eclecticism, 64 TAx L. REv. 149,
149-54 (2011); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REv.
745, 746-50 (2007); Weisbach, supra note 248, at 1-8; Bankman & Griffith, supra note 88,
at 1906-07; O'Reilly, supra note 76, at 584-87.
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where economically oriented tax scholars have a comparative advan-
tage. The same is true of their ability to consider a broad range of
values and approaches in assessing economic arguments. This is just a
partial list of the important areas of inquiry unaffected by the limits of
tax law and economics. These limits constrain the economic analysis
of tax policy, but they do not negate it.
At the same time, these limits reach beyond tax. The chasm be-
tween the ideal and the actual tax systems, combined with the perva-
sive influence of taxes on every area of economic regulation, is a
challenge to the entire law and economics movement. Whether one
considers optimal Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, optimal anti-monop-
olization policies, or any other government intervention, one must
recognize that ignoring the tax system can-and most likely does-
significantly impact the results. The limits of tax law and economics
transcend tax policy, extending to all aspects of the economic analysis
of law. If so, this Article's emphasis on the promising research agen-
das in tax law and economics has clear implications for the entire law
and economics project.
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